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ABSTRACT 
 The influence of ideology and attitudes on the decision-making process of 
Supreme Court justices has been well documented, such that the attitudinal model has 
emerged as the dominant paradigm for understanding judicial behavior.  When ideology 
and personal preferences seem to eclipse legal factors, such as adherence to 
precedent and deference to the democratically-elected branches, outcries of “judicial 
activism” have occurred.  Previous studies (Lindquist and Cross 2009) have 
operationalized judicial activism and have provided measures for studying behavior that 
may be considered activist (as opposed to restrainist), further supporting the premise 
that ideology trumps other extra-attitudinal and legal factors in the judicial decision-
making process.   
 While the attitudinal model indicates that ideology is the strongest predictor of 
judicial decision-making, this research will include a number of legal variables that have 
significantly influenced justices‟ votes.  As previous studies have demonstrated, an 
integrated model that combines a number of critical variables can have more 
explanatory power than one that relies on attitudinal reasons alone (Banks 1999; 
Hurwitz and Stefko 2004; Mishler and Sheehan 1996).  As such, the purpose of this 
research is to examine individual level decision-making of the most ideological justices 
on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts (1969-2004) in regards to their activist behavior to 
overrule legal precedents and invalidate federal statutes.  This research will employ 
multivariate regression analysis to assess the effects of attitudinal, legal and extra-
attitudinal factors in the judicial decision-making process. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Theoretical Grounding 
 Throughout American history, the U.S. Supreme Court‟s constitutional role has 
been to serve as a neutral arbiter of the law.  From the public‟s perspective, this entails 
the High Court‟s following of existing legal precedents and limiting its actions that could 
be interpreted as usurping powers that reside with the democratically-elected branches 
(i.e., overturning statutes, limiting the power of the president).  Although the nine 
unelected, essentially life-tenured justices cloak themselves in black robes representing 
their political disinterest, there is no doubt that the Supreme Court is a policy-making 
institution (Baird 2008; Posner 2008; Pritchett 1948; Schwartz 1992; Segal and Spaeth 
2002).  The role of the High Court as a policy-making institution is quite controversial, as 
normative arguments suggest it is undemocratic for unelected officials to wield such 
significant power.  At the same time, others argue that, “the rationale traditionally 
advanced for investing substantial political power in an unelected Court is the protection 
of minorities from democratic excess” (Mishler and Sheehan 1993, 1) as it is inherently 
a counter-majoritarian institution (Bickel 1962). 
 Members of Congress, the media, and the public alike echo alarm over the 
growing trend that is referred to by the ambiguous catch-all, “judicial activism.”  “For the 
most part, those who decry activist decisions focus on the judiciary‟s usurpation of 
political power from the elected branches, especially when judges render those 
decisions in accordance with their own policy preferences” (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 
1).  In fact, a 2005 American Bar Association survey found that 56% of Americans are 
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concerned that judicial activism has become a crisis (Neil 2005).  Although some 
political scientists have successfully operationalized and measured judicial activism 
(Lindquist and Cross 2009; Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and Spaeth 1996), generally 
the term is invoked when one is ideologically opposed to the Court‟s decision.  
“Everyone thinks that those who do not share his substantive views should be 
restrained” (Easterbrook 2002, 2).  Furthermore, ideological labels such as 
“conservative” or “liberal” dominate the public debate regarding judicial activism, 
transforming an institution that was once the alleged bastion of impartiality to a partisan 
body capable of delivering a perceived political decision such as Bush v. Gore (2000).   
 Undoubtedly, the role of the Supreme Court has changed over time: the 
expansion of the types of legal questions that the prevailing Court addresses and the 
evolution of its decision-making process allows the justices several opportunities to 
inject their personal preferences along the way, creating long-lasting policy implications 
for the nation (Pritchett 1949; Schubert 1964; 1965).  The litigious nature of American 
society has caused a dramatic expansion of the courts generally to areas of American 
life that were previously regarded as “private” (Carp and Rowland 1983, 5).  These 
uncharted territories are blank slates free from the limits of precedent or legislative 
guidelines and allow broad discretion for judges to rely on their personal values and 
political goals for decision-making (Carp and Rowland 1983).   
 However, despite its changing agenda, the public expects the Supreme Court to 
maintain some semblance of objectivity while interpreting the law, or else our American 
value of professing “justice for all” loses meaning.  Lacking both “the purse and the 
 
 
3 
sword” (Hamilton 1788), the Court must consider the public‟s perceptions of it as a 
neutral and disinterested entity in order to maintain its authority and legitimacy so its 
decisions have some effect (Barnum 1985; Caldeira 1986; Lindquist and Cross 2009; 
Mishler and Sheehan 1993).  “The lack of any formal connection to the electorate and 
its rather demonstrable vulnerability before the president and Congress mean that the 
United States Supreme Court must depend to an extraordinary extent on the 
confidence, or at least the acquiescence, of the public” (Caldeira 1986, 1209).  Hence, 
the American ideal of “justice for all” becomes threatened when the public perceives its 
neutral arbiters acting in a manner that is not neutral.  Accordingly, Caldeira (1986) 
found that instances of increased judicial activism (allowing attitudes and personal goals 
to dictate decisions) resulted in a decrease of the public‟s confidence in the Court, 
thereby threatening its legitimacy. 
 Judicial activism has garnered intense public debate, even though it is a rather 
subjective term with little consensus concerning its very meaning (Easterbrook 2002).  
Nonetheless, this contentious topic must be defined and measured if we are to 
understand the decision-making process of Supreme Court justices.  For the purposes 
of this study, judicial activism will be measured by two variables: namely, precedence 
conformance and judicial review of federal statutes.  Previous studies (Lindquist and 
Cross 2009) have included the judicial review of state and local laws or executive 
branch actions in their measures of judicial activism, yet those measures are excluded 
from the scope of this study, as the focus lies on the interactions with the federal 
branches of government and their potential influence over the Supreme Court. 
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 While recognizing the merits that the attitudinal model has provided for 
strengthening our understanding of judicial decision-making, this research posits that 
the attitudinal model is too simplistic to account for the multi-dimensionality and 
complexities that characterize justices‟ behavior.  Ideology may be the dominant 
motivator for a justice‟s vote to overrule precedent or invalidate a federal statute, but it 
seems naïve to suggest that legal and extra-attitudinal factors are not relevant at all.  As 
such, this study will rely on an integrated model, incorporating a number of legal and 
extra-attitudinal variables, in addition to ideology, in order to understand the complexity 
and strategies of a justice‟s individual decision-making.   
 This research will examine the individual votes cast by the most ideological 
justices who served during the Burger (1969-1985) and Rehnquist Courts (1986-2004) 
that resulted in the overruling of precedent or invalidation of a federal statute in order to 
determine which legal, extra-attitudinal and attitudinal factors are significant in 
influencing judicial decision-making.  By studying the most ideological justices who 
served on these two Courts (1969-2004), this research is able to assess the effects of 
the political environment, specifically, if the presence of unified or divided government or 
the party of the president constrains judicial decision-making.  For example, using a 
separation of powers model, this research will gauge the degree to which the presence 
of a conservative president and majority in Congress might affect the relative likelihood 
of an ideologically conservative justice‟s acting to invalidate federal statutes and 
overrule legal precedents, and vice versa. 
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 By focusing on the most ideologically extreme justices of the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts, this study hopes to isolate the effect of ideology and examine the 
impact of legal and extra-attitudinal factors.  Evidence gained from previous studies 
would allow us to presume that they are likely to manifest activist behavior, as the bulk 
of literature (Bonneau, Hammond, Maltzman and Wahlbeck 2007; Brenner and Stier 
1996; Hagle and Spaeth 1993; Hurwitz and Stefko 2004;) indicates that the most 
ideological justices are more likely than median justices to exhibit so-called activist 
tendencies in their decision-making.  For example, in regards to the invalidation of 
federal statutes, Hagle and Spaeth state: “To the extent that the Court accepts cases to 
reverse them, we might expect significantly different reversal rates for those justices 
whose voting patterns are more ideologically extreme” (1993, 495).  Thus, by focusing 
on the justices of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, this study seeks to determine which 
legal and extra-attitudinal factors are statistically significant in influencing the behavior 
of some of the most ideological justices and their centrist counterparts.    
Relevancy of This Research 
 Alexander Hamilton attempted to reassure American citizens that the newly-
created judiciary, as detailed in Article III of the Constitution, was “the least dangerous 
branch” (Hamilton, 1788, 437) of the nascent government.  He envisioned a Court that 
was insulated from the political whims of the legislature and the public so that the 
justices could interpret laws in a manner that was unbiased and in accordance with 
legal principles that have withstood the tests of time.  Surely, he never expected that the 
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Supreme Court would become the policy-making entity that it is today; yet it is difficult to 
argue against this notion, as ample evidence exists to support it (Baird 2004; Lindquist 
and Cross 2009; Schubert 1965; Segal and Spaeth 1996; 2002).   
 Anyone who has ever witnessed a Supreme Court confirmation hearing can 
attest to the ideologically-motivated questioning and personal attacks by senators 
through which they attempt to gauge the candidate‟s fit for one of the highest positions 
in the nation.  Furthermore, nominees are expected to divulge their personal views on 
major issues in the same way that senators and representatives do on the campaign 
trail.  The confirmation process is a sort of faux-town-hall meeting, in which the Senate 
and the public determine whether a Supreme Court nominee‟s liberal or conservative 
leanings will result in the desired policy outcomes.  For example, during the last three 
decades, nominees were questioned as to their personal beliefs on abortion so as to 
determine if a new member on the bench could sway the vote in order to uphold Roe or 
further chip away at it (Banks 1999).  The attitudinal model, which views the Court as a 
policy-making institution whose members rely on personal policy goals in their decision-
making, would predict that a change in membership could result in a change in law (or 
rather, policy). 
 During one of the most controversial periods of our nation‟s history, Chief Justice 
Earl Warren (1953-1968) presided over the Supreme Court and set in part the political 
course for our nation, expanding civil rights and liberties in an unprecedented manner.  
The Warren Court is often regarded as the most activist Court (Bickel 1962; Hart 1959), 
a moniker resulting from a number of decisions rendered during Warren‟s tenure that 
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promoted social change, generally at the expense of the Southern way of life.  The 
controversial Warren Court rulings have been criticized for eschewing previous legal 
precedents and for creating new legal rights in accordance with personal policy 
preferences.  For example, Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)i is regarded as an example 
of “judicial lawlessness” (e.g., Bork 1990) as the decision presumably created privacy 
rights that are not rooted in any legal grounding.  Similarly, the landmark decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954)ii reversed the precedent that Plessy v. Ferguson 
(1896) set, thereby ending federally sanctioned segregation in public schools in the form 
of “separate but equal” laws.iii  The unanimous decision overturned the precedent set in 
Plessy, but relied on the Fourteenth Amendment‟s guarantee of equality before the law.   
 Of course social norms change over time and with the norms so does the law 
and the interpretation of that law - which is how, in 1896, the declaration of separate but 
equal was constitutional in Plessy v. Ferguson, but in 1954, separate was declared to 
be inherently unequal in Brown v. Board.  Despite the criticism, the Warren Court cases 
have withstood the test of time. “Many of the most significant of these decisions remain 
intact, suggesting that, despite the frequent criticism, efforts to undermine the Court‟s 
standing „brought no literal change or damage to the Court or its rulings‟” (Lindquist and 
Cross 2009 as quoting Wicker 2002, 6). 
 The liberal decisions of the Warren Court have certainly lent credence to the 
attitudinal theory that justices view policy problems in accordance with their personal 
policy preferences. Because of the Warren Court‟s obvious liberal leanings, judicial 
activism has often been associated as a liberal phenomenon, incapable of being 
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associated with conservative justices.  However, with membership change resulting in a 
conservative majority on the Rehnquist Court, conservative justices may be just as likely 
as liberal justices to rely on personal preferences when interpreting the law (Lindquist 
and Cross 2009).   
 The Rehnquist Court may empirically be the conservative equivalent of the liberal 
Warren Court in regards to activist decision-making (Kerr 2003; Sunstein 2001).  The 
Rehnquist Court‟s willingness to invalidate congressional enactments under the 
Commerce Clause or the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments may indicate judicial 
activism by conservative justices (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 8).  Furthermore, although 
Justice Scalia purports that his judicial philosophy relies on a “strict constructivist” 
interpretation of the law, he has been known to ignore plain meaning or inconsistently 
interpret the intent of the Eleventh Amendment to suit his political preferences (Cohen 
2005).iv 
 The courts have become another arena for the political parties to battle out their 
ideological differences.  According to Pritchett (1968, 486), “The major development in 
public law since 1948 has been the shift of attention from the Court as enunciator of 
legal doctrine to the Court as instrument for the resolution of political conflict.”  Supreme 
Court confirmation hearings have become as politicized as elections, as senators prod 
nominees for their personal views on a range of issues, knowing that because of 
essentially lifetime tenure of federal judges and increasing life expectancy, justices are 
able to shape policy that will have broad implications for several generations of 
Americans.  In this sense, Supreme Court justices are essentially politicians who are not 
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directly accountable to any constituents, nor are they concerned with reelection 
campaigns.  Freed from these constraints, and also because they generally do not seek 
a higher office, Supreme Court justices are able to pursue their political goals 
unencumbered.  Their only challenge is to juggle the delicate balance between 
interpreting the law in accordance with legal principles, known as the legal model, and 
interpreting the law as close as possible to their ideal policy goals, known as the 
attitudinal model (Segal and Spaeth 2003).   
 This research intends to contribute to the ongoing debate between proponents of 
the attitudinal model and those of the legal and integrated models.  While the attitudinal 
model has demonstrated that ideology is the strongest predictor of judicial decision-
making, this research will also include a number of legal variables that have proven to 
significantly influence justices‟ votes.  As previous studies have demonstrated, an 
integrated model that combines a number of critical variables has more explanatory 
power than one that relies on attitudes alone (Hurwitz and Stefko 2004; Mishler and 
Sheehan 1996).  “While we largely agree that attitudinal influences explain the greatest 
proportion of variance concerning justices‟ votes on the merits, particularly when 
horizontal stare decisis is at issue, it seems to us that a model of Supreme Court 
decision-making can incorporate critical variables in addition to those based on attitudes 
and thus become even more explanatory” (Hurwitz and Stefko 2004, 122).  Hence, an 
integrated model that incorporates attitudinal, legal and extra-legal factors will be used 
in order to provide a thorough understanding of the complexities involved in the judicial 
decision-making process.  While the attitudinal model is a strong predictor of judicial 
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behavior on its own, it is believed that a much more nuanced understanding can be 
achieved by using an integrated model.  To separate this study from the bulk of 
literature that exists on the subject of judicial decision-making, this study will employ 
multivariate regression incorporating a number of attitudinal, extra-attitudinal and legal 
variables in an integrated model.     
Literature Review 
 Borrowing from Ancient Rome, a traditional idea of justice is based on a 
disinterested, impartial judge who is blind to subjective interests; hence, our image of 
Lady Justice who wears a cloth over her eyes and objectively weighs the scales of 
justice.  This traditional model of judicial decision-making was accepted until the early 
1900s when the Legal Realists emerged and began to doubt the tenets of the legal 
model.  “The nineteenth century stereotype of the Court as a body of aloof, bearded 
gentlemen in black robes who did not make law but merely discovered it by processes 
too mysterious for laymen to understand was already dissolving in the cynical acid of 
the twentieth century” (Pritchett 1968, 486).  The Legal Realist movement was an 
attempt to understand and reconcile a judiciary whose behavior could no longer be 
explained by the legal model.  As Pritchett (1968, 488) states: “A primary task for public 
law since 1948, then, has been [the] development of a theory of democratic government 
and judicial review, and a corresponding frame of reference for research, which would 
accommodate the participation of an activist court in the making of public policy.” 
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 Like other schools of thought based on realist theory, the Legal Realists focused 
on more self-interested motivations (namely attitudes, and social, economic and political 
values) to explain judicial decision-making.  Ever since the early realists (such as 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes) sought to explain international relations, the 
reigning theoretical notion explaining human behavior suggests that humans are selfish 
and seek to maximize their own interests.  As such, meshing together several schools 
of thought, including “pragmatism, behavioral psychology, psychoanalysis and statistical 
sociology,” the Legal Realists began to realize the influence of extra-legal factors upon 
the justices‟ decisions (Pritchett 1968, 487). 
 By the 1930s, political scientists began empirically researching and testing 
theories pertaining to judicial decision-making (Schubert 1964, 1975), and arrived at the 
judicial behavioral approach.  Simply put, “The judicial behavioral approach represents 
the fusion of theories and methods developed in various social sciences in order to 
attempt to study scientifically how and why judges make the decisions they do” 
(Schubert 1964, 3).  It could be said that the major rift between the traditional legal 
formalists and the proponents of the judicial behavior model was a response to the 
reorganization of the Court under President Franklin D. Roosevelt as it became 
apparent that policy preferences were clearly influencing the Court‟s decisions (Pritchett 
1968).  The Roosevelt Court demonstrated its propensity to inject ideology and attitudes 
into its decisions (Pritchett 1968), often striking down restrictive state policies that 
infringed on individual freedoms.  The controversial debate concerning the role of the 
Court was ubiquitous, evidenced by the “classic dialogue between Justices Black and 
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Frankfurter, representing the contrasting positions of judicial activism and judicial 
restraint,” (Pritchett 1968, 488) on the bench, and among political scientists and elites 
who were divided along ideological lines: those who believed that the Constitution is a 
living document, and those who believed that it is static and unchanging. 
 More recently, political scientists have largely accepted the attitudinal model as 
the dominant model for explaining judicial behavior.  An abundance of research (Baird 
2004; Hagle and Spaeth 1993; Mishler and Sheehan 1996; Lindquist and Cross 2009; 
Pritchett 1968; Segal and Spaeth 1996; 2002; 2003) has successfully demonstrated the 
influence of extra-legal factors (namely, justices‟ policy preferences and ideology) in the 
decision-making process.  “Segal and Spaeth verified overwhelming evidence that 
justices are not influenced by precedents with which they had disagreed, a critical 
aspect of the legal model.  Rather, they found that attitudinal explanations were much 
more consistent with respect to this type of judicial behavior” (Hurwitz and Stefko 2004, 
122).  As such, the attitudinal model has prevailed as the dominant paradigm for 
explaining judicial behavior. 
 Although the attitudinal model is the current dominant paradigm in explaining 
judicial behavior, some researchers (Banks 1999; Buena de Mesquita and Stephenson 
2002; Mishler and Sheehan 1996) suggest that a one-variable model is much too 
simplistic to truly account for the many factors that influence a justice‟s decision-making.  
After all, the Court may be insulated, but it is not isolated.  Instead, it depends on the 
executive branch in order to enforce its decisions, the public in order to maintain its 
legitimacy, and Congress, which manages the Court‟s jurisdiction and budget.  Hence, 
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while ideology may be a dominant factor in judicial decision-making, surely it is not the 
only factor that influences justices‟ votes.   
Role Theory 
 Similar to the above-mentioned paradigms, role theory is often utilized as a 
framework to understand judicial decision-making.  The behavioral theory supporting 
the utility of role theory as an analytical construct is that at least some portion of an 
actor‟s behavior is attributable to his or her role perceptions (Kitchin 1978).  Kitchin 
defines role as “a patterned sequence of learned actions or deeds performed by a 
person in an interaction situation” (1978, 22).  Furthermore, the general assumption 
among behavioralists is that humans attempt to maximize their utility.v  Utility is often 
correlated to desire or want; hence in order to maximize utility, an actor will seek to 
attain his or her preferences or policy outcomes.  As such, according to policy-based 
models of judicial decision-making, Howard and Segal (2004, 132) suggest that 
because of a lack of electoral accountability and a lack of ambition for higher office, 
justices will seek to maximize their desired outcomes by placing their policy goals at the 
forefront of their decision-making process.  In most political situations, there is a fair or 
balanced competitive equilibrium, although surely some actors have certain advantages 
over others occasionally.  However, Supreme Court justices are able to operate in a 
competition-free context because of the aforementioned advantages of no electoral 
accountability, little ambition for higher office, and essentially life-tenure, allowing them 
to maximize utility with very little relative effort. 
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 Kitchin (1978), who studied federal district judges, found that judges generally 
orient themselves to two purposive roles: the first role, which he refers to as process 
orientation, encompasses those judges who perceive their role as managing the 
caseload, focusing on the trial process itself, and operating an efficient, respected court.  
The second role is termed result oriented and is characterized by judges who see their 
jobs as deciding matters fairly, imposing justice, and legitimately resolving conflicts.  
Justices who tend toward activist decision-making are likely to fall into the latter 
category.  “Earl Warren was said to be the „paradigm of the result-oriented judge‟ who 
used his judicial authority to promote his own personal view of social justice” (Lindquist 
and Cross 2009, 4).  In Warren‟s attempts to create social justice, he may have 
confused what is fair with what may be legally correct by focusing on the outcome and 
how to arrive at that outcome.  As such, role theory obfuscates that line between result-
oriented decision-making and outright ideological activism.  On the one hand, a justice 
may vote one way because it is legally the “right” thing to do; on the other hand, the 
vote might be purely political and based on personal preferences so that the desired 
outcome is achieved. 
 In addition to the result-oriented justices, other policy-based models consider 
other responsibilities that a justice might find more appropriate; for example, a 
deference to public officials or a focus on restrainist behavior.  “Supreme Court justices‟ 
attitudes and policy goals may be constrained by beliefs of what is normatively 
appropriate, such as deference to the other branches of government, and particularly in 
constitutional cases, deference to the positions espoused by the Solicitor General of the 
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United States” (Howard and Segal 2004, 133).  In other words, an individual justice 
might follow a personal conviction to defer to the wishes of Congress or the president, 
despite his or her own personal ideology and political goals.   
 Likewise, Buena de Mesquita and Stephenson (2002) use role theory to explain 
how and why judges use legal factors to advance their policy goals.  In their study 
including appellate judges, they suggest that a policy-oriented judge is likely to defer to 
precedent because it improves the accuracy of guidelines that are communicated to the 
lower courts.  The basic idea is that a line of cases develops a legal principle better than 
any one individual case could.  For example, the idea of due process is vague and 
offers little meaning on its own.  However, a string of cases that follow precedent could 
shape policy by giving meaning to these inherently vague phrases (2002, 757).  Hence, 
deference to precedent can shape policy while also maintaining a sense of stability in 
the law, protecting the status quo, which in itself is a valued policy goal (2002, 756).  
Furthermore, a judge may follow precedent because the judge wants his or her own 
precedents to be upheld.  The narcissist judge cites to other cases because he hopes 
that other judges will cite to his.  Last, some policy-oriented judges will follow precedent 
because it protects the institutional power and legitimacy of the judiciary (Buena de 
Mesquita and Stephenson 2002).  The public expects that precedents will be followed, 
as that is the most obvious proof of judges acting as neutral arbiters of the law.   
 There is ample empirical evidence to support the presence of result-oriented 
decision-making on the Supreme Court (Lindquist and Cross 2009; Segal and Spaeth 
1996; 2002).  Furthermore, role theory may help to address variance in ideological 
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voting.  For example, there is an array of ideologies present on the Court at any given 
time, yet unanimous decisions are capable of being reached.  This could be the result of 
a justice‟s philosophy that his or her role encourages unanimous decisions to show the 
Court‟s cohesion on a controversial case.  Chief Justice Warren is often considered the 
ultimate “result-oriented” justice, as he often encouraged unanimity despite a difference 
of policy views among the justices, in order to give greater authority to decisions that the 
public may have derided (Lindquist and Cross 2009), such as Brown v. Board of 
Education (O‟Brien 2008).   
 Hurwitz and Stefko (2004) analyze justices‟ precedent conformance using role 
theory to suggest that justices experience an “acclimation effect.”  They find evidence 
demonstrating that newcomers to the bench follow a dynamic process of acclimation 
and that precedent conformance is a function of tenure.  Their findings confirmed their 
hypotheses that “votes for precedent dramatically abate as justices‟ tenures grow, while 
preference votes amplify with increasing tenure” (Hurwitz and Stefko 2004, 125).   
The Norm of Stare Decisis and Adherence to Precedents 
 The justices who served during the Nineteenth Century responded to the need to 
increase the legitimacy and authority of the Supreme Court‟s decisions by strengthening 
the norm of stare decisis (Fowler and Jeon 2008).  This need arose from the 
constitutional structuring of the Court that created an institution with little enforcement 
power and no accountability to the nation.  In this sense, the Court‟s decisions have 
been referred to as “paper tigers,” (Caldeira 1986) representing nothing more than a 
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mere suggestion by the Court‟s justices with no enforcement to actually implement their 
guidelines. By following the legal principle of stare decisis, the justices locate their 
decisions within a network of neutral legal opinions.  In other words, the norm of stare 
decisis represents a decision-making process that is unbiased or unaffected by the 
justices‟ personal values and accords with the law.  In this sense, justices arrive at the 
so-called correct decision because it is clear to the public that the law required it.   
 Fowler and Jeon (2008) demonstrate that the norm of stare decisis was in full 
effect by about 1900.  Since then, the justices have perpetuated this norm by writing 
opinions that cite precedent in order to demonstrate that their decisions are consistent 
with existing legal principles (Hansford and Spriggs 2006).  Furthermore, legal 
precedents are central in guiding lower court behavior and for ensuring that lower courts 
act within the constraints of the judicial hierarchical structure (Buena de Mesquita and 
Stephenson 2002; Carp and Rowland 1983).  Lower courts must act in accordance with 
the guidelines set by the Supreme Court, as the High Court has the power to reverse 
lower court decisions and will do so in order to maintain uniformity of legal interpretation 
throughout the judiciary (Buena de Mesquita and Stephenson 2002; Carp and Rowland 
1983).   
 Precedent is one tool that the Supreme Court can use to communicate its legal 
views within the judicial hierarchy.  In this sense, Supreme Court justices create long-
lasting policy by adhering to and strengthening existing precedents in order to structure 
future behavior within the lower courts.  “It is not the case that policy-oriented judges 
ignore precedent, nor is it the case that judges care about precedent instead of, or in 
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addition to, caring about policy.  Rather, judges care about precedent because they 
care about policy” (Buena de Mesquita and Stephenson 2002, 755).  Although the norm 
of stare decisis has persisted as an institutional tool to protect the legitimacy of the 
Court and to maintain uniformity throughout the judiciary, there are extra-legal factors 
that influence judicial decision-making. 
 Since the publication of Pritchett‟s The Roosevelt Court (1948), and Schubert‟s 
seminal works, The Judicial Mind (1965) and The Judicial Mind Revisited (1974), the 
suggestion that a judge‟s votes could be explained by his or her political views and 
values has gained increasing scholarly acceptance in further explaining judicial 
decision-making.  Schubert (1964; 1965; 1974) suggested that Supreme Court justices‟ 
behavior is influenced in part by their personal values and preferences as opposed to 
purely legal factors, and that they rely on extra-legal factors while interpreting the law.  
Since then, Segal and Spaeth (1993; 1996; 2002) have further developed the attitudinal 
model that the justices‟ political preferences influence their decision-making to some 
extent.  In testing the influence of precedent, these authors examine justices who 
initially dissented in a landmark case, then compare those justices‟ future votes in 
progeny cases in order to determine if the justices‟ votes changed from their initial 
revealed preference.  In this sense, the justices‟ preferences are estimated and can be 
compared to their votes.   
 The authors found that 90.8% of the votes conform to the justices‟ revealed 
preferences, and only 9.2% of the time did a justice switch to the position that 
established precedent supported.  Furthermore, only two justices (Potter Stewart and 
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Lewis Powell) showed any systematic adherence to stare decisis (Segal and Spaeth 
1996).  These results suggest that the influence of precedent is rather weak.  Similarly, 
a measure of attitudes seems more reliable in predicting justices‟ votes than are legal 
factors, as empirical evidence demonstrates that justices are not solely swayed by legal 
factors such as precedent.  Additionally, the finding that only two justices showed any 
systematic reliance on precedent implies that the norm of stare decisis has declined in 
power considerably. 
 Even after retesting and modifying Segal and Spaeth‟s (1996) model to account 
for perceived measurement errors, many political scientists have found substantial 
evidence to support the attitudinal model.  Brenner and Stier (1996) retested the 
attitudinal model, examining the four moderate justices of the Warren Court, believing 
that the centrist justices are most likely to adhere to precedent in that they are not as 
ideological as the justices found at each pole.  Brenner and Stier (1996, 1042) were 
unsatisfied methodologically with Segal and Spaeth‟s (1996) attitudinal model, arguing 
that it “either inflated the preference category or deflated the precedent category.”  To 
elaborate, Brenner and Stier (1996) assert that Segal and Spaeth misclassify some of 
the justices‟ votes, resulting in an inflation for the preference category and a deflation for 
the precedent category.  They argue that the coding that Segal and Spaeth employed 
did not take into account the direction of the justices‟ decisions and, thus, skewed the 
results.  For example, Segal and Spaeth classify justices‟ votes in favor of preference if 
the justice authored or joined the majority opinion that accepted the precedent in the 
progeny cases.  Brenner and Stier argue that these votes should be classified as “both 
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in favor of preference and in favor of precedent” (1996, 1039) and that this leads to an 
inflation of the preference category.   
 Furthermore, Brenner and Stier chose to include memo and per curiam cases 
that Segal and Spaeth excluded from their analysis.  Segal and Spaeth contend that 
these cases would substantially swell the progeny sample and should be excluded in 
order to assure decisional parity between precedents and progeny (Segal and Spaeth 
1996).  Thus, they chose to exclude per curiam cases and memosvi to maintain a sense 
of uniformity between what they coded as precedent and its future progeny cases.  Per 
curiam cases are brief decisions rendered by the Court, generally to ensure that the 
lower court decision accords with the law and, as such, they do not create progeny 
(Brenner and Stier 1996; Segal and Spaeth 1996).   Even still, Brenner and Stier‟s 
results do not show any evidence of the systematic adherence to precedents among 
moderate judges.  Overall, they find that the justices followed the established precedent 
less than half of the time (47%), with a range from a high of 73% for Justice Clark, to a 
low of 27% for Justice Harlan (Brenner and Stier 1996).  Surely 47% may seem high to 
some, indicating that precedent is, in fact, a significant influence for justices in their 
voting patterns.  On the other hand, some might suggest that the justices are merely 
flipping a coin, with a roughly equal chance that the case will be decided by either legal 
precedent or personal ideology.  Hence, the basic premise of the attitudinal model 
(namely that justices‟ votes are an extension of their policy preferences and attitudes, 
and not purely legal factors) gains considerable support. 
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 Likewise, Songer and Lindquist (1996) argue that the attitudinal model is “too 
blunt to capture the subtle interactions” (1052) of the choice continuum between 
precedent and preference.  Because of the uniqueness of the Supreme Court and its 
power to handpick the cases that it decides, there is an overrepresentation of cases 
selected for review that will inevitably result in the expansion of precedent, as the Court 
chooses cases in which the underlying precedent may be in conflict and those that 
represent compelling and divisive questions of the day.  “Therefore, in most of the 
progeny cases, the justices had the opportunity to vote in a manner consistent with their 
preferences without clearly repudiating precedent” (1996, 1050).   
 Surely, the act of overruling precedent is comparatively rare, and there are 
institutional benefits to adhering to precedent, including: protecting the legitimacy of the 
Court, setting guidelines that structure the behavior of lower courts, maintaining public 
support and influencing policy.  Yet the true power of the attitudinal model is being able 
to explain and predict when and why justices vote to overrule precedent or invalidate a 
statute.  Simply put, the attitudinal model explains that those votes were influenced by 
the justices‟ ideology and personal policy preferences as opposed to (or perhaps in 
addition to) established precedent or other purely legal factors (Baird 2008; Lindquist 
and Cross 2009; Schubert 1964; Segal and Spaeth 2003).   
 Since conservative and liberal justices both have a vested interest in maintaining 
the legitimacy and authority of their institution, it would seem that there should be little 
variance between ideology and precedent conformance.  Thus, both conservative and 
liberal justices have an interest in preserving the legitimacy of their institution, so we 
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should expect that justices‟ contrasting ideologies should follow precedent at similar 
rates. However, many prior studies (Lindquist and Cross 2009; Schubert 1965; 1974; 
Schwartz 1992; Segal and Cover 1989; Segal, Epstein, Cameron and Spaeth 1995; 
Spriggs and Hansford 2001) have suggested that the distance between a justice‟s ideal 
policy point and that of the precedent is significant in influencing a justice‟s decision to 
overrule the precedent.  For example, one study found that a one-unit increase in 
ideological distance between the median justice in the majority of the earlier cases and 
the median justice of the year of the overruling decision increases the case‟s likelihood 
of being overruled by 4.4% (Spriggs and Hansford 2001).  Accordingly, it would seem 
that those justices at each pole of the ideological continuum will be the most likely to 
vote to overrule established precedent by the simple fact that their ideological distance 
from a precedent is likely to be greater than that of a median justice.  Thus, the greater 
the ideological distance is between the precedent and the judge‟s ideal policy outcome, 
the greater the likelihood that a justice will vote in a way that will ensure a decision as 
close to his or her ideal point even if that means overruling established legal 
precedent.  
 Similarly, ideological distance also significantly influences justices‟ votes to 
invalidate federal statutes (Lindquist and Cross 2009). Simply put, the most ideologically 
divergent justices may be the most fervent in overruling precedent and invalidating 
statutes.  This point highlights the importance of the Court‟s agenda, as the types of 
cases that dominate the agenda will shape policy.  Thus, since the Supreme Court is 
largely unique in that it sets its own agenda, the ideology of the Court is likely to shape 
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the agenda according to the specific policy areas that it wishes to address and effect 
change in and, as such, the decisions will follow those agenda cues (Baird 2004, 2007; 
Mishler and Sheehan 1996). 
Judicial Review of Federal Statutes 
 The general argument opposing a Supreme Court that “legislates from the 
bench” is based on the premise that an unelected judiciary should take a deferential 
stance towards legislation or agency regulations that have been passed by elected 
officials or “more qualified appointees” so as to promote democratic influence (Posner 
2008).  However, although Posner (2008, 857) states that, “Judges decide cases 
entirely on the basis of their biases,” he is careful to point out that there is a tradeoff that 
exists in that “review by biased judges can counter legislative bias, forcing legislatures 
to enact fairer and more socially beneficial statutes than they would otherwise; but 
review by biased judges also raises legislative bargaining costs, thereby blocking some 
desirable statutes that would otherwise be enacted.”  Hence, Posner implies that the 
checks and balances system inherent in our government‟s structure is functional.  The 
judiciary is expected to review the legislature‟s behavior to ensure that the benefits and 
the costs are evenly distributed throughout society, so that one majority power does not 
benefit at the cost of the other (Posner 2008).  The two-party system that characterizes 
American politics perpetuates this cycle of fairness “as long as the parties exchange 
power frequently enough” (Posner 2008, 861).  As such, according to Posner (2008), 
judicial review is essential for ensuring that the legislature fairly distributes costs and 
 
 
24 
benefits throughout society.  However, Posner implies by his trade-off theory that 
judicial decision-making is obviously influenced by ideology.   
 Not everyone finds solace in Posner‟s trade-off theory, and instead view the 
Court‟s declaration of laws as unconstitutional as a troubling practice and the most 
controversial aspect of so-called judicial activism (Howard and Segal 2004; Lindquist 
and Cross 2009).  Not only does the act of judicial review circumvent the democratic 
process, but it may also impose a chilling effect on Congress.  While Posner interprets 
this as a beneficial result of the checks and balance system, others argue that an 
activist judiciary has the ability to alter Congress‟ behavior and influence the type of 
legislation that is passed (Lindquist and Cross 2009; Rogers and Vanberg 2007).   
 Marbury v. Madison (1803) was the first example of the Supreme Court‟s ruling 
an act of Congress as unconstitutional, thus creating the power of judicial review and 
officially granting itself the last word.  Despite ample criticism of the creation of the 
power of judicial review and the general consensus that the Courts should defer to the 
will of the democratic majority, “few argue that the Court should lack this capability…[as] 
judicial review remains at the heart of the Court‟s ability to protect the interests of 
unpopular minorities” (Howard and Segal 2004, 131).   
 Nonetheless, since the Supreme Court has the last word in the U.S. legal 
system, a normative argument suggests that countering the wishes of elected officials is 
contrary to the principles of democracy (Commanger 1943; Howard and Segal 2004).  
Furthermore, “the exercise of judicial review under the existing Constitution provides the 
Court with impressive institutional authority to inject itself into the policy-making process 
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by striking laws as unconstitutional.  For that reason, a consensus has emerged that the 
benchmark measure of judicial activism should be the invalidation of federal legislation” 
(Lindquist and Cross 2009, 134).  
 Despite all of the concerns of a crisis, most empirical evidence suggests that the 
Court is quite reluctant to strike down federal statutes (Howard and Segal 2004; 
Lindquist and Cross 2009; Segal and Spaeth 1993).  While Segal and Spaeth (1993) 
found that justices use their power of judicial review quite sparingly, they also found that 
when they do strike down a federal statute, it is generally ideologically motivated.  Thus, 
their evidence suggests that liberals strike down laws that infringe on individual liberties, 
while conservatives are more likely to strike down laws that limit business interests 
(Segal and Spaeth 1993).  Similarly, Lindquist and Cross (2009) isolate the ideological 
effect in order to determine what proportion of votes to strike down federal statutes is 
politically motivated.  Like Segal and Spaeth, these researchers find evidence to 
support the claim that the Supreme Court‟s decisions to strike down statutes are driven 
by personal policy preferences (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 58).  However, they also find 
that there is great variation among the individual justices and the likelihood that they will 
vote to invalidate a federal statute.vii  Perhaps this variation is due to the justices‟ 
perceived roles, as role theory dictates that some justices may be more deferential to 
the elected branches, despite their ideology.  This will be discussed further in the next 
section. 
 Howard and Segal (2004) review the propensity of justices to invalidate both 
federal and state laws and find that “ideological considerations predominate in the 
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decision to strike down” laws (138).  Although the justices rely on their power of judicial 
review in very few circumstances, those circumstances are likely tied to ideology.  Their 
research strategy relied on the number of requests for judicial review, the party 
requesting judicial review and the number of times the Court struck down the law.  Their 
overall findings suggest that the Court is reluctant to exercise its power of judicial 
review, with only 21% of all requests for certiorari being granted and only 10% of those 
actually resulting in an invalidation of the law.  Furthermore, they find that the Court 
generally will not strike a law unless a request is made.   
 One surprising finding for the authors was that there were more requests from 
liberal litigants than their were from conservative litigants (159 vs. 89) during an era of 
conservative control over the Court.  Overall, their findings show that “several 
conservative and liberal justices condition their activism and restraint on the ideological 
position of the party that requests judicial review, while the pooled model showed the 
entire Court conditions judicial review on ideology and the perceived ideological position 
of the Solicitor General” (Howard and Segal 2004, 142).   
 Furthermore, it is important to note that a position of deference does not exist for 
state laws in the manner that it does for federal laws, as all of the justices were more 
likely to strike down state laws, including Justice O‟Connor, a self-pronounced states‟ 
rights advocate (Howard and Segal 2004, 137).  There are several reasons that explain 
why state laws are more likely to be invalidated than are federal laws.  First, there are 
different rules regulating the judicial review of state and federal laws, under which 
federal laws are subject to strict scrutiny a very stringent test that requires a 
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compelling governmental interest that outweighs constitutional concerns in invalidating 
the law.  Second, the Supreme Court is the Court of last resort and is positioned at the 
top of the judicial hierarchy.  As such, it is obliged to make sure that the laws of the land 
are in accord with the Supreme Court‟s decisions and that there are no great disparities 
across the judicial circuits, as well as to ensure that state laws do not violate federal 
laws or constitutional rights.  For example, recent years have seen several video game 
laws passed by state legislatures struck down as the laws infringe on the First 
Amendment.viii  The Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear a caseix pertaining to a 
California law restricting the sale of video games that has been overruled by the 
Northern District of California and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  Last, 
Lindquist and Cross (2009, 48-49) suggest that state laws are more susceptible to 
invalidation in that they are limited in their scope and do not represent the national 
consensus in the manner that federal laws arguably do.  As such, the invalidation of a 
state law is not derided as a counter-majoritarian action in the same magnitude as a 
federal law is, and the state law “may be contrary to the national popular will” (Lindquist 
and Cross 2009, 49). 
Legal Factors  
 Although the attitudinal model is quite successful in explaining why justices vote 
the way they do, there is ample evidence suggesting that a number of legal factors 
significantly influence the likelihood of a precedent‟s or federal statute‟s being overruled.  
These legal factors will be explained below: the unanimity of the decision; the presence 
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of amicus briefs or support from the Solicitor General; issue type; and, the lower court 
decision and direction. 
 It seems intuitive that unanimous decisions will have a lower tendency of being 
overruled, in that they carry more authority or integrity by the breadth of their consensus 
(Benesh and Reddick 2002; Spriggs and Hansford 2001).  “Without unanimity, 
adherence to the rule of law is difficult because the first essential of a lasting precedent 
is that the court or the majority that promulgates it be fully committed to its principle” 
(Banks 1999, 8).  For example, Chief Justice Warren encouraged the Court‟s unanimity 
in such controversial decisions, such as Brown v. Board, knowing that a break from 
established precedent could cause a backlash (especially in the Southern states), but 
also because a unanimous decision enhances the legitimacy of the decision (O‟Brien 
2008). 
 Spriggs and Hansford (2001) found that a minimum winning coalition (MWC) 
increases the risk of a precedent‟s being overruled by 53.6% while a unanimous 
coalition decreases that risk by 46.9%.  However, Banks (1999) finds that unanimity is 
not a guarantee that precedent is sacrosanct: 33.3% of the overrulings in this study 
were originally unanimous decisions.  Clearly, consensus regarding the inviolability of 
unanimous precedents is mixed; while some argue that unanimity does or does not 
matter, others have found that the level of consensus does not reach statistically 
significant levels (Hurwitz and Stefko 2004).  Perhaps the size of the voting coalition 
carries more weight when combined with other factors.  For example, Spriggs and 
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Hansford (2001) found that the greater the consensus and clarity of a precedent, the 
less likely the precedent will be overruled.   
 On the other hand, dissents and previous negative interpretations are perhaps 
significant in raising the risk of a precedent‟s being overruled (Banks 1999; Spriggs and 
Hansford 2002).  In fact, Spriggs and Hansford‟s (2002) results suggest that if a 
precedent has been treated negatively in the past, it is 57.4% more likely to be 
overruled.  A precedent receives negative treatment if it is severely distinguished or 
limited in subsequent rulings by the Court, therefore weakening its precedential value.  
As Chief Justice Hughes so eloquently states, “A dissent in a court of last resort is an 
appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day when a later 
decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the 
court has been betrayed” (Banks 1999, 241).    Recognizing the cues in the form of 
negative interpretations or written dissents, experienced litigators will pursue a strategy 
in order to unravel a weak precedent that is incongruent with their particular interests 
and those of the current Court majority (Baird 2007).  
  Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson (2002) also emphasize that the justices will 
act within the constraints of precedents as a means for furthering their policy goals.  
Because of the communication and informational value that precedents offer, justices 
will use precedent in order to shape policy as close as possible to their preferences.  
The underlying theory is that Justices can influence the application of the law by 
deciding how to tailor its opinion.   
“The basic idea is that the development of lines of cases can 
communicate a legal principle better than an individual case 
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could. An initial case may invoke a general phrase or 
principle such as, „due process,‟ „reasonable,‟ or „compelling 
interest;‟ future cases will then develop and give meaning to 
these inherently vague phrases” (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Stephenson 2002, 757). 
 
Following this logic then, older precedents will be more entrenched within the legal 
community, so that even when judges disagree with these rulings, they will be more 
reluctant to overrule them.  Similarly, when a precedent is young, it can easily be 
molded and adapted to fit within the policy goals, making a break with precedent 
unnecessary.  Accordingly, their results suggest that precedents of intermediate age are 
most vulnerable to being replaced and older precedents are only at risk when 
confronted by a Court with substantially divergent preferences (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Stephenson 2002).  On the other hand, there are studies with completely contradictory 
findings.  For example, one suggests that recent precedents are more at risk (Banks 
1999) and another found that the age of the precedent did not reach statistically 
significant levels (Hurwitz and Stefko 2004).   
 Third parties and interest groups often file amicus briefs in order to signal to the 
Court the important policy implications of a particular case (Baird 2004; Wahlbeck 
1997).  Indeed, amicus briefs serve an important function to the Court by alluding to the 
saliency of a case or legal question.  Wahlbeck (1997, 784) found that amicus support 
“did enhance the likelihood that the Court would produce expansive legal change.”  In 
analyzing search and seizure cases, Wahlbeck (1997, 795) found that, “on the 
occasions when the search is supported by substantial amicus support and the 
 
 
31 
government is not supported by amici, the chance of expansive legal change is twice as 
great as the benchmark.”  
 Evidence suggests that justices also consider issue type and issue saliency 
when deciding to overrule legal precedents or invalidate statutes.  Lindquist and Cross 
(2009) found evidence to suggest that ideological voting may be more pronounced in 
cases to overturn precedent because those cases are more ideologically salient.  
Similarly, the existing literature supports the underlying theory (Banks 1999; Benesh 
and Reddick 2002; Spriggs and Hansford 2001; 2002) that justices behave differently 
when considering the overruling of constitutional or statutory rulings. Using Brenner and 
Spaeth‟s analysis of the Rehnquist Court, Banks (1999) found that 65% of the 
overrulings dealt with constitutional concerns, while only 20% were statutory.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court is responsive to institutional concerns in that it is more likely to adhere 
to precedent if the chance of being overruled is present.  Evidence that the type of case 
may constrain the Court‟s actions is further proof of the significance of legal and 
institutional factors. 
 Lower court decisions also have shown to significantly influence future judicial 
decisions (Hagle 1993; Hagle and Spaeth 1993).  Hagle (1993) found that “by 
controlling for the direction of the lower court decision, changes in voting patterns due to 
changes in the cases will not be mistaken for initial attitudinal instability” (1145).  
Furthermore, Hagle and Spaeth (1993) together emphasize the importance of the lower 
court decision as a controlling variable. In an examination of the Burger Court‟s 
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decisions on business cases, the lower court‟s decision significantly impacted every 
justice‟s decision.   
Extra-Attitudinal Factors: The Political Environment and Public Opinion 
 Howard and Segal (2004) studied the effect of the political environment on the 
judiciary, specifically if a change in the partisan control of Congress and the presidency 
might result in a shift in the justices‟ preference for deference.  The authors test the 
separation-of-powers hypothesis in order to determine if conservative justices are more 
or less likely to strike down liberal and/or conservative requests.  They hypothesize that 
conservative and moderate-conservative justices should be the most constrained in 
their actions (i.e., showing great deference to liberal requests and the least support for 
conservative requests) during the period from 1993 to 1994 when the Democrats 
controlled both chambers of Congress, as well as the presidency.  What they find, 
however, is that there is little evidence to support the idea that the justices act 
strategically in their interactions with Congress and the presidency.  “All of the 
conservative and moderately conservative justices actually have a greater rejection rate 
of liberal requests to overturn federal laws during the purportedly constrained years than 
they do during the unconstrained years” (Howard and Segal 2004, 136).  Interestingly, 
justices are responsive to the Solicitor General, who serves as the top attorney 
representing the United States government‟s interests before the Supreme Court.  
When the Solicitor General supports a request to strike, the justices were more likely to 
vote to strike the law.  For example, the authors found that when President Clinton‟s 
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Solicitor General requested a law be struck down, the liberal justices were more likely to 
adhere to that request (Howard and Segal 2004, 141).  This is likely because the 
Solicitor General, the U.S. attorney appointed by the president, and who likely shares 
his ideological bent, is requesting the invalidation of a law that will likely result in a policy 
decision that is close to the liberal justices‟ ideal point.  Just as liberals in Congress will 
generally support a liberal president‟s legislative agenda (Conley 2000), Howard and 
Segal‟s (2004) evidence indicates that justices are also likely to be receptive to the 
policy agenda of the executive branch via the Solicitor General.      
 Just as a president is generally more successful in passing his legislative agenda 
during a period of unified government (Conley 2000), the Supreme Court may be most 
effective in impacting policy when the majority of the Court and the party of the 
president are the same.  As mentioned above, the solicitor general, a known repeat 
player in the High Court, is able to influence the subsequent behavior of Supreme Court 
justices (Baird 2004; Howard and Segal 2004; Lindquist and Cross 2009).  The serving 
president appoints the solicitor general and the two are likely of the same ideological 
bent (Carp and Rowland 1983; Wahlbeck 1997).  If a conservative Court, as is the case 
with the Rehnquist Court, is met with a conservative solicitor general (appointed by a 
conservative president) who requests that a law be invalidated, it is almost certain that 
the Court will grant the request (Howard and Segal 2004).  As such, a conservative 
Court could be empowered by the election of a Republican president, or a liberal Court 
may be emboldened by the election of a Democrat, as each are representative of the 
public mood to some extent.   
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 Mishler and Sheehan (1993) suggest that the Court‟s ideological composition 
changes in response to shifts in the ideological orientation of the president and 
Congress, independent of membership change. It is intuitive that a Court‟s ideology will 
respond accordingly to changes of its membership; a newcomer to the bench may shift 
the Court to the left or right on the ideological continuum because of their respective 
ideology.  However, there is a lack of consensus as to the influence of the president or 
Congress influencing the ideological make-up of the Court.  Mishler and Sheehan 
(1993), however, find that Court‟s members may shape their ideology in regards to the 
acting President or party control of Congress.  As such, a shift in the ideological position 
of the Court increases the likelihood that new policy areas may be addressed. 
 Furthermore, they found that the Court is responsive to public opinion both 
directly and indirectly (Mishler and Sheehan, 1993).  Public support of the Supreme 
Court is essential to maintaining legitimacy, as the institution lacks any effective 
enforcement tools and its source of authority stems solely from its reputation (Barnum 
1995; Caldeira 1986; Durr, Martin and Wolbrecht 2000).  Although the Court is insulated 
from the public in that its members are not directly elected and have no accountability to 
a constituency, empirical evidence suggests that the Court infrequently strays too far 
towards a counter-majoritarian decision (Barnum, 1995; Mishler and Sheehan, 1993).  
As mentioned previously, the Court is dependent on the public for its very legitimacy 
because of its institutional structure.  The Court‟s institutional prestige is heavily 
influenced by the public‟s perceptions of the Court as a neutral entity.   
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 Similarly, the partisan control of Congress may affect the Court‟s actions.  For 
example, Harvey and Friedman (2006) assert that when the Republicans gained control 
in Congress, the probability of the Court‟s striking down a liberal law rose by 47%.  As 
such, “the Rehnquist Court‟s willingness to strike Congressional enactments may have 
been empowered or inspired by a conservative mood in the country or a conservative 
Congress that was unlikely to retaliate against the Court” (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 
52).  Thus, the Court is sensitive to the policy views of the democratically-elected 
branches.  This is known broadly as a “separation of powers” model.   
 Furthermore, Durr, Martin and Wolbrecht (2000, 772) report that the Court‟s level 
of public support is a function of “the degree to which the Court‟s ideological position 
deviates from the public‟s ideological preferences.”  In theory, then, the members of the 
Court assess the so-called national mood by the party of the democratically-elected 
president and Congress.  As such, justices at the ideological extremes may feel 
empowered when a president or Congress of their same ideological bent is in power 
and may be more willing to overrule established precedents or invalidate federal 
statutes.  Furthermore, if the president has the opportunity to nominate new justices to 
the bench, thus changing the ideological composition of the Court, then there may be 
new formal opportunities to create policy (Mishler and Sheehan 1996).   
Institutional Factors and Agenda Change 
 During the Rehnquist Court (1986 to 2005), the plenary docket shrunk from 
around 150 cases to less than 100 cases per term, consisting of a full briefing and oral 
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arguments before the Court. .  According to the attitudinal model, the Supreme Court 
organizes its agenda according to the ideological composition of its members and 
specific policy areas in which it wishes to affect change in or create lasting policy 
implications (Baird, 2008; Lindquist and Cross, 2009; Mishler and Sheehan, 1996).  
According to Easterbrook (2002, 2), “these justices decide which cases to take, and 
they are likely to choose those in which the call to activism is hard to resist.”   
Furthermore, Mishler and Sheehan (1996) found that as the ideological center of the 
Court becomes more conservative, the Court will grant certiorari to a larger number of 
conservative cases and to more strongly conservative cases, or those with greater 
policy implications.  
 Although the Court cannot formally solicit cases, Baird (2004) offers evidence to 
suggest that the Court tacitly signals litigants demonstrating its willingness to hear 
cases pertaining to certain policy areas or salient issues.  In this sense, the Court not 
only shapes its own agenda, but it is also able to choose well-crafted cases that allow it 
to shape policy in those areas (Baird 2004).  She finds that the Supreme Court tacitly 
works together with its litigants and repeat players (such as the Solicitor General) to 
signal certain policy priorities of high saliency.  The litigants interpret these cues, 
(namely, conflict, disagreement with lower court decisions, the presence of amicus 
briefs, and support for the Solicitor General and strategic considerations of the 
justices‟), and then present well-crafted cases for the justices at a time lag of 
approximately five (5) years (Baird 2004, 766).  A five-year time lag is hardly an 
obstacle for essentially life-tenured justices who wish to make policy.   
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 Like other political actors, Supreme Court justices act strategically, weighing their 
own vote in light of the other eight members on the bench, in order to have the most far-
reaching policy implications (Mishler and Sheehan 1996; Segal and Spaeth 1996; 
2002;).  According to the Rational Choice Model (Segal and Spaeth 2002), rational 
justices act strategically, considering the consequences of their own decision in light of 
the others on the bench in order to maximize their utility.  For example, if a justice is 
weighing her decision to grant certiorari in a disfavored case in hopes of overturning the 
decision, but she knows that the Court will not overturn the decision, then it would be in 
her best interest to act strategically and to deny certiorari.  Similarly, there are 
numerous examples of justices‟ voting against their preferences in order to achieve a 
unanimous decision, or upholding a well-established precedent and maintaining the 
status quo, or because they realize that their preferred outcome is impossible.  As such, 
a change in the Court‟s ideological composition means that new voting coalitions may 
be created on the Court, pushing the policy center to the left or right.  
 The relative ideological composition of the Court in the period that will be 
examined leads to the following hypotheses: 1) the Court‟s agenda will reflect the 
ideological composition of the justices themselves, in that the four votes necessary to 
hear the case are comparatively easily garnered (Mishler and Sheehan 1996); and, 2) 
the justices at the ideological polesx may feel empowered to address issues that they 
theretofore would have ignored because they lacked the sufficient votes necessary to 
overrule a precedent (Mishler and Sheehan 1996).   
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 Accordingly, the conservative composition of the Rehnquist Court should reflect 
an agenda in which ultimately liberal precedents and statutes may be overturned, 
conservative precedents will be strengthened, and conservative statutes will remain 
undisturbed.  Similarly, a liberal-dominated Burger Court would likely result in an 
agenda in which conservative precedents and statutes are overturned, while liberal 
precedents and statutes will be upheld. 
Summary 
 Judicial decision-making is often the topic of intense debate, although the 
attitudinal model has prevailed as the accepted paradigm for explaining why justices 
vote the way they do.  As the existing literature attests, ideology is one of the strongest 
predictors of judicial behavior (Baird 2004; Howard and Segal 2004; Hurwitz and Cross 
2004; Lindquist and Cross 2009; Segal and Spaeth 1996; 2002; Spriggs and Hansford 
2001).  Of particular interest for the purpose of this study are the justices who served on 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts (between the years of 1969-2004) and are located at 
the polar ends of the ideology continuum.  The ideologically polarized justices are more 
likely to behave as activists because of their disparate policy views.  Furthermore, while 
a great deal of literature accepts the Supreme Court as a policy-making institution with 
partisan political goals, there is a lack of empirical evidence pointing to the systematic 
behavior of conservative and liberal justices who exist at the ideological extremes.   
 Although the Supreme Court is insulated, it does not operate in a political 
vacuum.  As such, a number of legal, extra-legal and political variables will be employed 
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in an integrated model for a more complete and accurate view into one of the most 
complex institutions in our country.  The next chapter will elucidate the hypotheses, 
variables and theoretical groundings that are central to this study. 
 
 
40 
CHAPTER TWO: MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
Uniqueness of this Analysis 
 The attitudinal model, as developed by Segal and Spaeth (1993; 1996; 2002), 
has served as the dominant paradigm in explaining judicial decision-making, 
questioning the influence of legal factors as a predictor of justices‟ vote choice.  The 
attitudinal model prescribes that ideology and attitudes are sufficient to predict and 
explain why Supreme Court justices vote the way they do.  While the bulk of the 
literature pertaining to judicial decision-making supports the predictive power of the 
attitudinal model, its reliance on only one variable has earned it the nickname, “the 
naïve attitudinal model” (Mishler and Sheehan 1996, 198).  In reality, legal factors and 
other extra-attitudinal factors have some influence over judicial decision-making (Banks 
1999; Barnum 1985; Buena de Mesquita and Stephenson 2002; Harvey and Friedman 
2006; Hurwitz and Stefko 2004;Mishler and Sheehan 1996;).  Unanimous decisions 
provide evidence of such, as justices may consider factors beyond ideology in these 
instances of unanimity.  Similarly, strategic voting in accordance with the rational choice 
model may motivate a justice to vote against his or her ideology in order to achieve the 
desired outcome (Segal and Spaeth 2002).  Furthermore, evidence suggests that 
ideology may have a larger influence over more ideological justices than median 
justices, who may be more likely to respond to precedent or public opinion (Brenner and 
Stier 1996; Mishler and Sheehan 1996).  Thus, it is evident that judicial decision-making 
is much more nuanced and complex than the attitudinal model alone might suggest.   
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 As such, this research seeks to understand the behavior of the most ideological 
justices, those who are positioned at each pole on the ideological continuum.  It is of 
particular theoretic interest to determine whether these justices are influenced by legal 
and extra-attitudinal factors, or if ideology alone dictates their decisions.  Furthermore, 
this research seeks to understand the systematic differences between ideologically 
conservative and liberal justices, and to determine if they respond differently to legal 
and extra-attitudinal factors.  To date, the bulk of the literature regarding judicial 
decision-making seems to address the ongoing debate between proponents of the 
attitudinal model and those of the legal model (Brenner and Stier 1996; Brisbin 1996; 
Buena de Mesquita and Stephenson 2002; Knight and Epstein 1996; Mishler and 
Sheehan 1996; Segal and Spaeth 1996; Songer and Lindquist 1996; Spriggs and 
Hansford 2001; 2002) or focuses on the median justices (Baird 2004; Brenner and Stier 
1996; Bonneau, Hammond and Wahlbeck 2007; Grofman and Brazill 2002;).  There is 
very little evidence to increase our understanding of the differences and motivations 
between ideological justices who are very conservative or liberal. 
 The focus of this research is centered on the most ideological justices because it 
is presumed that their behavior may be characterized as the most activist and 
ideologically motivated (Brenner and Stier 1996; Lindquist and Cross 2009; Segal and 
Spaeth 1996).  The attitudinal model has demonstrated that the likelihood of a 
precedent‟s being overturned or a federal statute‟s invalidation increases when the 
ideological distance between the justice‟s ideal point and the policy outcome is the 
greatest.  By the simple fact that the most ideologically conservative and liberal justices 
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are at opposite poles, the ideological distance is thereby likely to be greatest in cases 
that request the invalidation of a statute or address a precedent‟s longevity.  The 
attitudinal model dictates that ideology is the driving factor behind judicial decision-
making, so it is of particular interest to determine if legal factors or extra-attitudinal 
factors influence decision-making for these ideological justices.  By isolating and 
examining the most ideological justices, this research intends to determine the extra-
attitudinal and legal factors that influence decision-making beyond ideology alone.   
Data and Methods 
 The period of analysis for the purposes of this research will be the Burger (1969-
1986) and Rehnquist (1986-2005) Courts.  These two Courts allow a logical 
juxtaposition of an ideologically liberal and conservative Court and provide a more 
balanced sample of extreme ideologues than would the examination of only one of 
these Courts.  Nineteen justices served during the period examined, and six of these 
may be characterized as extreme ideologues.xi   
 The most ideological justices were determined using Martin and Quinn Scores 
(2002), providing an ideological measure for each justice for each term that they served 
on the Supreme Court.  These scores are derived using votes on the merits of a case 
that were collected from the United States Supreme Court Database and they place 
each justice along the ideological continuum.  The Martin and Quinn (2002) scores are 
methodologically superior to previous ideological scores that have been developed, in 
that they: 1) are based on actual behavior (as opposed to news editorials, such as the 
 
 
43 
Segal and Cover (1989) propose); 2) are dynamic, allowing longitudinal comparisons; 
and 3) have demonstrated high correlations for a number of legal issues, not simply 
those concerning cases regarding civil liberties and civil rights votes (2002, 13).  
Furthermore, they have demonstrated a higher correlation than the Segal and Cover 
(1989) scores (Martin and Quinn 2002, 13).  The scale ranges from -6.656 (extremely 
liberal, as demonstrated by Justice Douglas) to 3.884 (extremely conservative, as 
demonstrated by Justice Thomas). 
 Using the Martin and Quinn Scores (2002), the ideology scores of each justice 
for the years 1969 through 2004 were recorded, as well as the calculated mean and 
standard deviation values.  For the purposes of this study, the most ideological justices 
are defined as those justices who are more than one standard deviation away from the 
policy mean for each Court term.  These justices are: Douglas, Brennan, Rehnquist, 
Marshall, Stevens and Thomas.  These six justices‟ votes for each Court term that they 
were identified as an ideologue will serve as the unit of analysis in this examination of 
judicial behavior.     
 This study will employ multivariate regression. Regression analysis is the 
preferred method for examining the influence of several independent variables, as it 
isolates “the effect of one independent variable on the dependent variable, while 
controlling for the effects of other independent variables” (Pollock 2009, 187).  Thus, we 
can examine the effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable while 
holding the other variables constant.  Furthermore, multiple regression helps to detect 
spurious relationships that may interfere with the analysis.   
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 Two dependent variables will serve as measures of judicial activism for the focus 
of this study.  First, the overruling of legal precedent serves as one of the dependent 
variable, as precedent is one of the most easily understood and observable legal 
factors.  Thus, when justices decide cases according to previous legal precedent, it is 
obvious that they are following the law and, thus, are serving as neutral arbiters of the 
law.  However, when a precedent is overruled, however rare that may be, claims of 
judicial activism are made and the legitimacy of the decision is sometimes called into 
question.  “The most visible and dramatic instance of interpretative instability comes 
when the Court explicitly overrules one of its own earlier decisions” (Canon 1983, 241).  
This study will utilize data from the U.S. Supreme Court Database (Spaeth 2005) in 
order to determine which justices‟ votes resulted in the alteration of precedent or the 
invalidation of a federal statute.  Precedent conformance will be measured by justices‟ 
votes that resulted in the alteration of precedent for cases that were orally argued 
before the Court during the 1969 through 2004 terms.  Votes are coded as 0 if the 
justice voted for the alteration of precedent (a preference vote) and as 1 if the justice‟s 
vote conformed to the precedent (a precedent vote). 
 The second dependent variable that has been chosen for the purposes of this 
study is a measure of judicial activism measured by votes to invalidates federal statutes.  
To measure the second dependent variable, I relied on data collected from the U.S. 
Supreme Court Database.  Accordingly, justices‟ votes that deemed an act of Congress 
as unconstitutional will be coded as 1, and all votes that upheld the statute will be coded 
as 0. 
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 A number of independent variables will be measured in order to capture the 
effect of possible attitudinal, extra-attitudinal and legal factors that influence the 
likelihood that a justice will vote to overrule precedent or invalidate a statute: 
 Ideology Scores.  The Martin and Quinn scores identifying each justices‟ ideal 
point along the ideology continuum will be used.  The Martin and Quinn scores have a 
range of -6.656 (extremely liberal, as demonstrated by Justice Douglas) to 3.884 
(extremely conservative, as demonstrated by Justice Thomas).     
 Decision Direction.  In order to account for the ideology of the case outcome, a 
variable denoting the direction of the decision will be used.  The decisions will be coded 
using data from the U.S. Supreme Court Database so that conservative case outcomes 
will be coded as 1, liberal case outcomes will be coded as 2, and those cases where a 
direction can not be specified are coded as 3.   
 Number of Dissents.  In order to account for the weight of the decision, a variable 
measuring the number of dissents written by justices in the minority of the original case 
will be included.  The literature has not reached a consensus to date regarding the 
influence of the vote split on the likelihood that a precedent is overturned, yet it seems 
intuitive that unanimous decisions and those with fewer corresponding dissents are less 
likely to be overturned (Banks 1999; Spriggs and Hansford 2002).   
   Lower Court Decision.  Hagle (1993) found that “by controlling for the direction of 
the lower court decision, changes in voting patterns due to changes in the cases will not 
be mistaken for initial attitudinal instability” (1145).  Furthermore, Hagle and Spaeth 
(1993) together emphasize the importance of the lower court decision as a controlling 
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variable. In an examination of the Burger Court‟s decisions in economic cases, the 
lower court‟s decision was a statistically significant influence in economic decisions for 
every justice‟s vote.  To measure the lower court decision, this study will rely on data 
from the U.S. Supreme Court Database.  The variable lcdisposition specifies the 
treatment of the case in issue‟s previous rulings; that is, whether the lower court 
affirmed, reversed, remanded, for example, the previous decisions based on the merits 
of the case (Spaeth 2005).  This variable is coded 1-12 as follows: 1 – stay, motion 
granted; 2 – affirmed; 3 – reversed; 4 – reversed and remanded; 5 – vacated and 
remanded; 6 – affirmed and reversed in part; 7 – affirmed and reversed in part and 
remanded; 8 – vacated; 9 – petition denied or appeal dismissed; 10 – modify; 11 – 
remand; 12 – unusual disposition.    
 Lower Court Disposition Direction.  This variable specifies the direction of the 
lower court decision and is coded as follows: 1 – conservative; 2 – liberal; 3 – 
unspecifiable.   
 Issue Type.  Each case will be coded according to issue type in order to 
determine if there is an underlying association with a justice‟s decision and to determine 
if any patterns arise along ideological lines.  The values of this variable are coded as 
follows: 1 – Criminal Procedure; 2 – Civil Rights; 3 – First Amendment; 4 – Due 
Process; 5 – Privacy; 6 – Attorneys; 7 – Unions; 8 – Economic Activity; 9 – Judicial 
Power; 10 – Federalism; 11 – Interstate Relations; 12 – Federal Taxation; 13 – 
Miscellaneous; 14 – Private Action.   
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 President’s Ideology.  A continuous variable representing the president‟s 
ideology will be measured using Poole‟s (1998) “common-space” scores, coded as -1 
(extremely liberal) to 1 (extremely conservative). 
 Congress’ Ideology.  Using the Poole and Rosenthal DW-nominate scores, the 
mean views of all the members of Congress will be calculated to represent the ideology 
score.   These scores are coded using a scale from -1 (extremely liberal) to 1 (extremely 
conservative). Thus, the ideological distance between the Supreme Court and Congress 
can be determined.  
 Divided vs. Unified Government.  A dummy variable to signify the presence of 
unified (the same party controls both the White House and both chambers of Congress) 
or divided (one party controls the White House and another party controls either one or 
both chambers of Congress) government will be employed.  A unified government will 
be coded as 0, and divided government will be coded as 1.   
 These variables will be tested via multiple regression analysis in order to 
examine the following hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1a: In a comparison of Supreme Court justices who served between 
1969 and 2004, those who are the most ideological (at the ideological extremes 
according to the Martin and Quinn Scores (2002)) will vote to overrule established 
precedents more frequently than their centrist counterparts.   
 Hypothesis 1b: In a comparison of Supreme Court justices who served between 
1969 and 2004, those who are the most ideological (at the ideological extremes 
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according to the Martin and Quinn scores (2002)) will vote to invalidate federal statutes 
more frequently than their centrist counterparts.   
 Hypothesis 2a: The justices who are identified as the conservative ideologues 
will likely overrule more liberal precedents than their conservative non-ideologue 
colleagues. 
   Hypothesis 2b:  The justices who are identified as the liberal ideologues will likely 
overrule more conservative precedents than their liberal non-ideologue colleagues. 
 Hypothesis 3a: When the party of the president and the majority of Congress are 
both aligned with the party of the majority on the Court, then the justices will be less 
likely to invalidate federal statutes. (Unified Government Hypothesis)  
 Hypothesis 3b: When the party of the president and the majority of Congress are 
NOT aligned with the party of the majority on the Court, then the justices will be more 
likely to invalidate federal statutes. (Divided Government Hypothesis)    
Summary 
 This analysis is intended to supplement previous attitudinal studies that propose 
that Supreme Court justices are political beings who use their personal ideology, values, 
and attitudes in order to decide questions of the law.  Specifically, this study examines 
the systematic behavior between the ideologues on the bench.  Undoubtedly, the role of 
the Court has changed as it delves into political questions that were theretofore 
reserved for democratically-elected politicians.  As such, political scientists may develop 
a deeper understanding of the Court within a political context and determine if the 
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ideological patterns of behavior that are evident in the other branches of government 
are emergent on the Court as well.    
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CHAPTER THREE: OVERRULING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS 
Findings and Analysis 
 The first measure of judicial activism examined for the purposes of this research 
is the overruling of legal precedent.  In general, a high degree of precedence 
conformance represents judicial restraint in that by following established legal 
precedents, justices are noticeably following the law.  Simply put, “The binding nature of 
precedent is seen as a constraint on judicial power and hence a limitation on activist 
decision-making” (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 123).  Precedent bolsters predictability, in 
addition to prestige and legitimacy of the High Court.  As such, it is not surprising that 
the Court‟s overruling of legal precedent is a rare occasion.  Justices are reluctant to 
overrule established precedent in order to maintain the legitimacy of the Court (Epstein 
and Knight 1996; Lindquist and Cross 2009; Young 2002).  “The authority of precedent 
is generally thought to be one of the most important institutional characteristics of 
judicial decision-making” (Young 2002, 1150).   
 Certainly the reluctance of justices to overrule precedent is apparent in empirical 
evidence.  From 1969 to 2004, spanning the tenure of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, 
the justices voted to overrule precedent in 91 cases out of a total of 4,087 that received 
plenary review.  Table 1 shows the percentage of cases in which precedent was 
overturned for each Court term of the observed period.  The data were collected from 
the United States Supreme Court Database (Spaeth 2005), identifying cases that 
resulted in the formal alteration of precedent for each court term.  Votes were counted 
as “for the alteration of precedent” if they are coded in the database as: 1 – voted with 
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majority or plurality; 3 – regular concurrence; and 4 – special concurrence (Spaeth 
2005).   
Table 1 Percentage of Cases Overturning Precedent by Court Term 
Court 
Term 
Percentage of 
Cases 
Overturning 
Precedent 
Court 
Term 
Percentage of 
Cases Overturning 
Precedent 
1969 2.2% 1987 1.4% 
1970 2.6% 1988 4.4% 
1971 1.5% 1989 0.8% 
1972 2.1% 1990 4.5% 
1973 1.4% 1991 1.9% 
1974 1.6% 1992 0.9% 
1975 4.3% 1993 2.4% 
1976 4.0% 1994 3.4% 
1977 3.1% 1995 5.3% 
1978 0.8% 1996 0% 
1979 2.3% 1997 3.3% 
1980 0.8% 1998 1.3% 
1981 0.7% 1999 1.3% 
1982 1.3% 2000 1.3% 
1983 2.0% 2001 4.0% 
1984 1.4% 2002 1.4% 
1985 2.7% 2003 2.8% 
1986 4.1% 2004 1.4% 
 
 Accordingly, evidence suggests that the Burger Court began its tenure as fairly 
activist, overruling two to three precedents per term, generally at a rate of 2%, more or 
less.  President Nixon appointed Burger to the Supreme Court to replace Chief Justice 
Warren in 1969 with the expectation that Burger would prove to be a strict constructivist 
in his judicial interpretations.  Moreover, conservatives hoped that Chief Justice Burger 
would overrule some of the controversial rulings of the Warren Court.  However, 
empirical evidence suggests that the Burger Court was not as activist as some 
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conservatives may have hoped.  Instead, more than half (54.35%) of the cases that 
resulted in the overruling of precedent actually produced liberal decisions.  Only twenty-
one cases (45.65%) reached a conservative outcome. 
 In 1975, the Burger Court appears extremely activist, overruling six precedents in 
one term (4.3%), although there does not appear to be a decisive pattern or 
explanation.  These cases spanned a variety of issue topics, including: Criminal 
Procedure, Economic Activity, the First Amendment, Federalism and Unions.  Overall, 
the Burger Court appeared to be the most activist, overruling precedents in cases 
pertaining to Economic Activity (17) and Criminal Procedure (11).  Towards the end of 
Chief Justice Burger‟s tenure, again there is a rather high rate of precedents‟ being 
overruled, and this pattern seems to continue into the Rehnquist Court.   
 Indeed, the Rehnquist Court begins its tenure clearly abandoning legal 
precedent, thus prompting the indignation of Justice Marshall, “who denounced 
Rehnquist‟s plurality opinion in [Payne v. Tennessee] on the grounds that the Court was 
creating a novel theory of stare decisis” (Banks 1999, 1).  In fact, during the 1995 Court 
term, 5.3% of the cases argued before the Supreme Court resulted in the overruling of 
precedent.  The actual number of cases overruled in 1995 was four, but the percentage 
rate for that Court term appears high because of the shrinking docket that characterized 
the Rehnquist Court.  Of these four cases, two were decided in the liberal direction 
(pertaining to the First Amendment and judicial power) and two were decided in the 
conservative direction (concerning due process and federalism).  It appears that the 
Rehnquist Court heed to existing legal precedent more often as its tenure increases.  
 
 
53 
The majority of cases (38%) examined concerned Criminal Procedure and, not 
surprisingly, 60% of these cases that resulted in the overruling of precedent led to a 
conservative decision.   
 Table 1 provides some background information regarding the rate of precedence 
conformance on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts in the aggregate, but the focus of this 
study is on the individual justices, specifically those who are identified as extreme 
ideologues.  As such, I calculated the percentage of each justice‟s votes to overturn 
precedent (the numerator) divided by the total number of votes (the denominator) cast 
during their service on the Burger and/or Rehnquist Courts.  Table 2 shows the results 
for both the ideologues and the non-ideologues‟ rates of overruling precedent.   
 Surprisingly, comparing the mean rate of justices‟ votes to overrule precedent 
shows that the mean for the ideologues (.0132) is actually lower than the mean for the 
non-ideologues (.0156), suggesting that the more centrist justices vote to overrule 
precedent more often than the justices who have been characterized as ideologues.  
The standard error for the ideologues‟ mean rate of overruling precedents is .0012 and 
the standard error for the non-ideologues‟ mean was calculated as .0007.  As such, in 
an infinite number of random samples of justices, .0108 represents a minimum mean 
rate of precedents overruled for the ideologues, and .0170 represents a maximum mean 
rate of precedents overruled for the non-ideologues.  Furthermore, the standard error of 
the difference between the ideologues and the non-ideologues‟ means is .0014.  Using 
the one-tailed test of statistical significance, the null hypothesis that the observed 
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differences in the mean rates of overruling precedent between the ideologues and the 
non-ideologues occurred by chance or random sampling error can be rejected.   
Mean difference – 1.645(standard error of the difference) 
.0024 – 1.645(.0014) = .0001 
The p-value was determined to be .0436, so the probability value is less than .05, 
indicating that the null hypothesis can safely be rejected (Pollock 2009). 
 
Table 2 Percentage of Total Justice Votes to Overturn Precedent on the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts, 1969-2004 
Justice Name Percentage of Total 
Justice Votes to 
Overturn Precedent 
William O. Douglas * 0.82% 
Anthony Kennedy 1.07% 
Potter Stewart 1.07% 
Thurgood Marshall * 1.23% 
William Brennan * 1.25% 
John Paul Stevens * 1.39% 
David Souter 1.49% 
Stephen Breyer 1.49% 
Warren Burger 1.52% 
Clarence Thomas * 1.56% 
John Marshall Harlan II 1.58% 
Lewis F. Powell 1.59% 
Byron White 1.63% 
Sandra Day O‟Connor 1.63% 
William H. Rehnquist * 1.68% 
Hugo Black 1.72% 
Antonin Scalia 1.79% 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 1.79% 
Harry Blackmun 1.93% 
       * = Ideologue Justices 
 The total mean rate for all of the justices‟ votes (ideologues and non-ideologues 
alike) to overrule precedent is .0149.  It is apparent that the majority of the non-
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ideologue justices actually vote to overturn precedent at a greater rate than the total 
mean, and certainly at a greater rate than the most ideological justices.  Thomas and 
Rehnquist have the highest rates of overruling precedent of the six ideologues, and 
eight of the twelve non-ideologues (Justices Black, Blackmun, Ginsburg, Harlan, 
O‟Connor, Powell, Scalia, and White) have a higher rate of overturning precedent than 
the total mean.  Accordingly, Justice Blackmun has the highest rate of overturning 
precedent (1.93%) during the observed period.  The evidence also demonstrates the 
infrequency of which justices vote to overturn precedent, as none of the justices‟ rates 
lie above the 2% line, although Justice Blackmun‟s votes come close. 
 These results do not support Hypothesis 1 which asserted that the ideologue 
justices would vote to overrule precedent at higher rates than would the non-ideologues.  
The hypothesis was based on the theory that because the ideological distance between 
the justice‟s ideal point and the policy outcome of the precedent was likely largest for 
the ideologue justices, more activist behavior would occur.  However, these results 
suggest that the agenda likely plays a larger role than originally hypothesized.  Because 
of the conservative nature of the Rehnquist Court, the agenda is likely comprised of 
weak liberal precedents and strong conservative precedents.  Thus, the conservative 
justices have more opportunities to overrule liberal precedents, which could account for 
such high rates of overruling precedent by non-ideologues such as Justices O‟Connor 
and Scalia.  Furthermore, previous evidence (Lindquist and Cross 2009) suggests that 
centrist justices are more likely to cross ideological lines when voting to overrule 
precedent.  This could likely explain the high rates of overruling by the non-ideologues, 
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as they are more likely to overrule precedents regardless of the ideological 
incongruence between their ideal point and that of the precedent, whereas the 
ideologues are likely to overrule precedents only when the ideological distance is great. 
 In order to examine the ideological influence of justices‟ voting behavior, I 
calculated the proportion of cases that resulted in a liberal outcome for each justice for 
his or her total votes in all cases, as well as cases that resulted in the overruling of 
precedent.  Hypothesis 2a theorized that the ideologue justices would have more 
pronounced ideological voting behavior.  Yet, the results presented in Table 3 show that 
ideological patterns are evident for all of the justices, ideologues and non-ideologues 
alike.xii In fact, according to Table 3, some of the non-ideologues demonstrate much 
more pronounced ideological voting than the ideologues.  In comparing Justices Breyer 
and Brennan, it is apparent that Justice Breyer exhibits ideological voting more often.  
Although Justice Breyer voted to overrule precedent less often than did Justice 
Brennan, when he did, it was almost always (90%) in order to achieve a liberal 
outcome.  As such, these results do not substantiate the theoretical grounding of 
Hypothesis 2a.   
 Justice White has served as a model of judicial restraint and moderation 
(Lindquist and Cross 2009).  The results of Table 3 bolster this characterization, as his 
votes to overrule precedent do not show any specific ideological leaning.  Surprisingly, 
Justice Thomas also exhibits an ideologically moderate voting record to overrule 
precedent, as half of his votes to overrule precedent were in the liberal direction.  This 
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seems completely out of character for a justice that is considered a conservative 
ideologue (Cohen 2005; Lindquist and Cross 2009). 
 
Table 3 Justices Votes to Overrule Precedent by Ideological Outcome 
Justice Total Votes to 
Overrule 
Precedent 
% Liberal Votes to 
Overrule Precedent 
% of Liberal 
Votes That Do 
Not Alter 
Precedent  
Blackmun 45 51.11%  50.09% 
Brennan* 36 66.67%  65.43% 
Breyer 11 90%  54.45% 
Burger 32 43.75%  36.7% 
Ginsburg 13 84.62%  55.81% 
Harlan 3 66.67%  49.15% 
Kennedy 31 41.94%  42.66% 
Marshall* 36 75%  65.56% 
O‟Connor 36 22.22%  40.82% 
Powell 32 40.62%  38.72% 
Rehnquist* 57 24.56%  33.04% 
Scalia 22 27.27%  36.60% 
Souter 16 75%  55.42% 
Stevens* 33 57.58%  55.78% 
Stewart 26 65.38%  45.85% 
Thomas* 14 50%  34.58% 
White 46 50%  45.12% 
* = Ideologue Justices 
 The literature overwhelmingly confirms that judicial behavior is largely driven by 
personal preferences (Baird 2008; George and Epstein 1992; Hagle and Spaeth 1993; 
Hurwitz and Stefko 2004; Lindquist and Cross 2009; Pritchett 1968; Schubert 1964; 
Segal and Spaeth 1996; 2002); thus, the justices‟ corresponding rates of precedent 
conformance must be evaluated while also considering the effects of ideology and the 
agenda.  As previously mentioned, substantial evidence exists suggesting that 
conservative justices vote to overrule liberal precedents, while liberal justices vote to 
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overturn conservative precedents (Lindquist and Cross 2009; Segal and Howard 2001).  
For example, Howard and Segal (2001) found that Justices Scalia and Thomas and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist voted to overrule liberal precedents twice as often as they 
voted to overrule conservative precedents, yet liberal Justices Brennan, Stevens and 
Souter demonstrated support that crossed ideological lines.  As such, a great deal of 
disparity exists between justices ideological behavior.     
 As such, in order to understand the various influences on the justices‟ votes, a 
series of multivariate linear regression analyses were completed.  A number of variables 
were used in the regression analyses with data collected from the United States 
Supreme Court Database (Spaeth 2005), the Martin and Quinn Justice Ideology scores 
(Martin and Quinn 2002), as well as Poole and Rosenthal‟s (1998) common space 
scores calculating the ideology scores for Congress and the Presidents for each court 
term.  Two regressions were estimated, the first examining the six justices who were 
identified as ideologues for the purpose of this study, and the second regression 
represents the 13 non-ideologue justices.  The justices‟ votes for or against precedent 
served as the unit of analysis, and each case within the dataset was coded to 
incorporate the justices‟ ideology during that specific Court term, the president‟s 
ideology score and the ideology score of Congress in the aggregate.  A dummy variable 
signifying divided or unified government was included along with other variables from 
the United States Supreme Court Database, including: issue area, direction of decision, 
lower court decision, and the number of dissents.  Table 4 shows the results of the 
regression analysis for the six justices characterized as ideologues (Brennan, Douglas, 
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Marshall, Rehnquist, Stevens and Thomas).  The adjusted R2 of .027 indicates that the 
total relationship between all of the variables is rather weak of all of the variation 
among these ideologue justices‟ votes, only about 3% is explained by the independent 
variables.   
 In regards to judicial decision-making, consensus dictates that ideology is one of 
the most descriptive variables for predicting behavior.  The regression coefficient for the 
ideology score is -.028, indicating an inverse relationship.  Accordingly, for every one-
unit increase in the independent variable (as justices become more conservative), 
precedence conformance decreases by .010 units.  Looking at the t-ratio of -6.843, it is 
apparent that the coefficient is well above the 2-or-greater rule, and we can reject the 
null hypothesis.  Furthermore, the significance coefficient of .000 for the justices‟ 
ideology score indicates that the results are statistically significant.   
 These findings accord with the bulk of the literature concerning judicial decision-
making that suggests that ideology is one of the most important variables for explaining 
behavior.  Furthermore, the Pearson correlation coefficient describing the relationship 
between the justices‟ ideology and corresponding vote is r = -1.00, indicating a negative 
association.  Thus, as the ideology score of the justice increases (becomes more 
conservative), precedent conformance decreases.  These results must be considered in 
the context of the period examined, and are likely the product of the conservative 
membership of the Court.  During the observed period, every Supreme Court nominee 
(with the exceptions of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, who were appointed by President 
Clinton) was appointed by a conservative president.  As such, a different court 
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comprised of a more balanced or more liberal membership would certainly yield 
different results.  Furthermore, the docket composition and the cases reviewed certainly 
sways these results as well.  A conservative majority will likely shape the court‟s docket 
to reflect a conservative agenda, so that weak liberal precedents are overturned and 
conservative precedents are upheld.        
Table 4: Regression Analysis of Ideologue Justices to Overrule Precedents 
Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Constant 2.003 .100  20.055 .000 
Justices‟ 
Ideology 
-.028 .004 -.114 -6.843 .000** 
Lower court‟s 
decision 
direction 
.000 .032 .000 .013 .990 
Lower court 
decision 
.008 .008 .015 1.030 .303 
Issue area -.033 .004 -.113 -7.516 .000** 
Direction of the 
decision 
-.117 .032 -.057 -3.668 .000** 
R square = .028 
Adjusted R Square = .027 
Std. Error of the Estimate = 1.024 
* p  .05 
** p  .001 
N = 4462 
 
 As the results in Table 4 demonstrate, there are two other variables in addition to 
ideology that achieve statistical significance: the direction of the decision (conservative 
or liberal) and the issue area.  These results accord with previous findings suggesting 
that the issue area is a legal factor that significantly influences justices‟ decisions to 
overrule precedent (Banks 1999; Hagle and Spaeth 1993; Wahlbeck 1997).  However, 
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this variable is likely interacting with ideology, as conservatives and liberals are known 
to be influenced by different issue areas (Hagle and Spaeth 1993; Lindquist and Cross 
2009); for example, evidence demonstrates that liberals are more likely to vote in order 
to expand civil rights whereas conservatives will vote to limit those rights.  Both 
coefficient estimates are negatively signed with very large t-statistics indicating that the 
null hypothesis can be rejected.  
 This analysis would not be complete without a comparison of the ideologues 
behavior with that of the non-ideologues.  As such, Table 5 provides the results of the 
regression analysis completed with all of the non-ideologues‟ votes for the period 
examined.   
 In a comparison of the justices‟ mean rates of precedent conformance, it became 
apparent that the non-ideologues had a higher rate of overruling precedents than the 
ideologues.  A comparison of the regression analyses shows that there are several 
similarities between the two groups.  One difference is that non-ideologues seem to 
consider one legal factor that the ideologues do not as the direction of the lower court 
decision reached statistical significance for the non-ideologues.  Furthermore, the 
direction of the decision does not reach statistically significant levels, possibly implying 
that the ideological direction of the policy outcome is not as influential for the non-
ideologues as it is for the ideologue justices.  Furthermore, ideology does not reach 
statistically significant levels for the non-ideologues.  The coefficient of the ideology 
variable is also in the negative direction, but it is not nearly as strong of an influence for 
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the non-ideologues as the ideologues.  As such, other variables besides ideology are 
the driving force behind non-ideologues likelihood of overruling precedent.     
Table 5: Regression Analysis of Non-Ideologue Justices to Overrule Precedent 
Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Constant 2.204 .199  11.077 .000 
Justices‟ 
Ideology 
-.010 .021 -.053 -.473 .637 
Lower court‟s 
decision 
direction 
-.170 .079 -.088 -2.161 .031* 
Lower court 
decision 
.006 .015 .014 .383 .702 
Issue area -.041 .010 -.155 -4.071 .000** 
Direction of 
the decision 
-.128 .077 -.067 -1.665 .096 
R square = .029 
Adjusted R Square = .024 
Std. Error of the Estimate = .940 
* p  .05 
N=9659 
 
 Hence, we can discern that the ideologues and the non-ideologues differ in their 
treatment of precedent in that ideology is a stronger influence for the ideologues in their 
votes to overrule precedent, although the non-ideologues actually have slightly higher 
rates of overruling precedent.  These findings suggest that the non-ideologues may 
consider some legal factors, such as the issue area and the lower court‟s decision, 
while deciding to overrule precedent.  
 Logistic Regression analysis was estimated for the ideologue justices in order to 
further examine the relationship between ideology and overruling precedent.  The 
results depict a negative relationship, as the odds ratio for the relationship between 
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ideology and overruling precedent is .211.  Using this odds ratio, it can be determined 
that for every one-unit change in ideology using the Martin and Quinn (2002) scores 
decreases the odds of overruling precedent by 78.9%.  The results indicate that only 
two independent variables achieve statistical significance: the decision direction (.050) 
and the justices‟ ideology (.023).  Nonetheless, adding all of the independent variables 
improves the predictive power of the likelihood of overruling precedent.  The chi-square 
test statistic indicates that the extant model is an improvement on the MLE initial know-
nothing model, as the value is 125.274.  This value, although not statistically significant 
(.98), suggests that the independent variables improve our ability to predict the 
likelihood of overruling precedent.   
Table 6 Logistic Regression Analysis for Ideologue Justices 
Model 
Estimates 
Coefficient Significance 
Constant 1.253  
Ideology 8.784 .023 
Decision 
Direction 
1.331 .050 
Lower Court 
Decision 
1.280 .073 
Lower Court 
Decision 
Direction 
1.318 .089 
Issue Area 1.533 .139 
Model 
Summary 
Value Significance 
Chi-Square 125.274 0.98 
Cox-Snell R-
Square 
.356 
Nagelkerke R-
Square 
.422 
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 In reviewing the results for the ideology variable, it becomes apparent that a non-
linear relationship exists between the justice‟s ideology and the likelihood that the 
justices vote to overrule precedent.  In other words, it was hypothesized that the 
likelihood of overruling precedent would increase for those justices who lie at the 
extreme values along the ideological continuum.  However, the results suggest that the 
middle range of the ideology variable has the most contrast, as a one-unit change in 
ideology can sway the justice to vote in order to uphold precedent or vote to overrule 
precedent depending on his or her specific point along the ideological continuum.   
 The logistic regression estimate for the non-ideologue justices indicates that only 
the lower court decision variable achieves statistical significance (.008).  The 
relationship between ideology and the likelihood of overruling precedent is quite difficult 
to determine as there is great variance among the ideology values.  As such, the results 
from the logistic regression suggests that the relationship between ideology and the 
likelihood of overruling precedent is non-linear, as there is not a uniform association for 
predicting a change in ideology with the likelihood that precedent will or won‟t be 
overruled.  Ideology combined with the other independent variable provides a more 
detailed picture for increasing the predictive power.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES 
Findings and Analysis 
 The second measure of judicial activism concerns the judicial review of federal 
statutes.  The Supreme Court established the power of judicial review in the landmark 
case Marbury v. Madison (1803), creating the power to rule acts of Congress 
unconstitutional.  Although some may view this power as essential for maintaining the 
balance of power among the three federal branches of the U.S. government, others 
argue that it disrupts the delicate balance.  “By voiding an act of the elected branches, 
the Court arguably places itself in the position of disrupting the constitutional separation 
of powers by assuming legislative power” (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 47).  As such, the 
invalidation of federal legislation is considered the “benchmark measure” of judicial 
activism (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 48). 
 Similar to the overruling of legal precedents, the invalidation of federal statutes is 
a rare occurrence.  The United States Supreme Court Database (Spaeth 2005) provides 
data containing justices‟ votes in cases that ruled an act of Congress as 
unconstitutional.  For the purposes of this examination, only federal statutes were 
considered, excluding cases pertaining to the invalidation of state, municipal and local 
laws.  During the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, an act of Congress was declared 
unconstitutional on fifty-four (54) occasions.  Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution 
of these instances, as well as the total number of challenges.   
 As the findings demonstrate, the Burger Court (1969-1986) used the power of 
judicial review quite sparingly.  With the exception of five Court terms (1969, 1970, 
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1972, 1975 and 1982), the justices voted to invalidate statutes at a rate of one or less 
per term, despite the fact that there was a large amount of opportunities to do so.  
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that 77.27% of these cases were decided in the 
liberal direction.  Furthermore, the majority of these cases concerned Civil Rights and 
the First Amendment.  Of the eight cases that the Burger Court justices ruled 
unconstitutional pertaining to Civil Rights, each one was decided in the liberal direction.  
 
Figure 1 Frequency Distribution of Federal Statutes Challenged and Invalidated by Court Term 
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 The Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) begins its tenure exhibiting quite restrainist 
behavior.  In fact, for the first eight years of Chief Justice Rehnquist‟s service, only three 
acts of Congress were ruled unconstitutional.  However, the next eight years 
demonstrate a disproportionate amount of statutes that were invalidated by the 
Court a total of 30.  When considering the political environment of that time period, 
these results seem to substantiate the findings of Harvey and Friedman (2006), who 
provide evidence to suggest that the Supreme Court is influenced by Congress‟ 
ideological preferences.  The majority of these rulings declaring Congressional acts 
unconstitutional occurred when the Republican Party maintained control of Congress.  
According to Harvey and Friedman, who examined the Rehnquist Court from 1987 to 
2001, “The justices were less likely to hear cases involving constitutional challenges to 
liberal statutes from 1987 to 1994, when the House and the Senate were under 
Democratic control, than they were from 1995 to 2001, when Republicans had a 
majority in both chambers” (2006).  These findings indicate that the justices consider the 
political environment and the ideological make-up of Congress.  For example, their 
reluctance to invalidate liberal statutes during a period of Democratic control of 
Congress may be evidence of the court‟s concern for the public‟s preferences, lest it be 
characterized as a countermajoritarian institution (Barnum 1985; Mishler and Sheehan 
1993). 
 The issue of utmost concern during the Rehnquist Court was the First 
Amendment as almost half (43.75%) of these federal statutes pertained to this 
Constitutional right.  Another 25% concerned federalism, not surprising considering the 
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number of states‟ rights advocates on the Rehnquist Court.  Perhaps most surprising is 
that the majority (53.13%) of these rulings resulted in a liberal decision.  However, when 
the issues are considered in conjunction with the decision direction, the results are 
similar to what would be expected from the Rehnquist Court: all (N=8) of the cases 
concerning federalism were decided in the conservative direction, and almost all 
(92.9%) of the First Amendment cases where decided in the liberal direction.  The First 
Amendment requires a strenuous test of strict scrutiny under which the Justices review 
the law, making it a difficult task to limit the rights enumerated in the First Amendment.   
 Multivariate regression analysis was completed using justices‟ votes to invalidate 
federal statutes as the dependent variable.  Table 7 shows these results.  Most 
importantly, none of the independent variables reached the level of significance.  Yet 
interestingly, the coefficient for Congress‟ ideology indicates a substantial influence, 
though it‟s statistically insignificant.  On the other hand, the relationship between the 
acting president‟s ideology and the justices‟ votes to invalidate statutes is inversely 
related.  The coefficient‟s value is -.025, suggesting that for every one-unit increase in 
the acting president‟s ideology (as the president becomes more conservative) there is a 
corresponding .025-unit decrease in the number of justices‟ votes to invalidate statutes, 
although it too is not significant.  
 These findings may support those of previous studies (Harvey and Friedman 
2006; 2008; Mishler and Sheehan 1993) that suggest that the justices‟ decision-making 
is influenced by the ideological make-up of Congress.  In this regression, Congress‟ 
ideology resulted in the largest coefficient value of all of the other independent 
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variables.  Similarly, Harvey and Friedman (2008, 3) found that “the likelihood that the 
Rehnquist Court during its 1994-2001 terms would review a generic liberal statute 
enacted between 1987 and 1994 increased by 123% as a result of the rightward 
congressional turn of Congress after 1994, and by 500% for landmark liberal statutes.”  
Mishler and Sheehan (1993, 97) found that “the ideological and partisan orientations of 
the president and Congress are also important.” 
 
Table 7: Regression Analysis of Ideologues’ Votes to Invalidate Statutes 
Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
Constant 2.051 1.888  1.086 .285 
Issue Area .001 .055 .005 .026 .979 
Ideology Score .049 .047 .188 1.042 .304 
Divided/Unified 
Gov‟t Dummy 
Variable 
.213 4.231 .080 .050 .960 
President 
Ideology 
-.025 4.427 -.009 -.006 .996 
Congress‟ 
Ideology 
3.613 8.932 .107 .405 .688 
R Square = .045 
Adjusted R Square = -.091 
Std. Error of the Estimate = 1.202 
*p  .05 
N=3111 
  
 In reviewing the regression analysis of the non-ideologue justices‟ votes to 
invalidate statutes, it is apparent that there are more similarities between the two groups 
than there are differences.  Table 8 shows these results.  Again, none of the variables 
reach levels of statistical significance.  The coefficient estimate for Congress‟ ideology is 
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not as strong for the non-ideologues as it was for the ideologues suggesting that the 
Congress‟ influence is not as great for the non-ideologues.  Perhaps the most 
interesting difference between the two regression estimates is that the President‟s 
ideology has reversed directions for the non-ideologues.  Thus, for every one-unit 
increase in the president‟s ideology (as the president becomes more conservative), 
there is a corresponding increase in the justices‟ votes to invalidate statutes.  Again, this 
finding is not statistically significant.       
 
Table 8 Regression Analysis of Non-Ideologues’ Votes to Invalidate Statutes 
Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
Constant 1.863 .199  9.361 .000 
Issue Area -.019 .015 -.062 -1.267 .206 
Ideology Score .025 .102 -.012 -.239 .811 
Divided/Unified 
Gov‟t Dummy 
Variable 
.178 3.959 .067 .045 .964 
President 
Ideology 
.010 4.164 .004 .002 .998 
Congress‟ 
Ideology 
1.594 2.777 .107 .409 .685 
R Square = .004 
Adjusted R Square = .000 
Std. Error of the Estimate = 1.013 
*p  .05 
N=6241 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 Judicial activism has become the catch-all phrase for conservatives and liberals 
alike for characterizing Supreme Court decisions that are disagreeable to one‟s own 
policy preferences.  Indeed, judicial scholars have provided substantial evidence to 
suggest that justices make decisions in order to advance their own policy goals, yet the 
justices must consider a number of constraints that limit their ability to achieve those 
goals.  Thus, while ideology is a significant predictor of judicial behavior, it is not the 
only one.  The findings of this research contribute to previous literature that suggests 
that extra-attitudinal and legal factors act as constraints, limiting justices‟ votes to 
overrule precedents and invalidate statutes within the context of the justices personal 
preferences.  The justices will temper their decisions and try to get as close as possible 
to their ideal policy outcome while considering these constraints.  
 Perhaps Justice Souter‟s commencement address at Harvard University explains 
the judicial decision-making process best when he described the “fair-reading model.”  
In this sense, justices must make a decision among various competing values that have 
been embedded in the Constitution and this does not constitute judicial activism, but is a 
necessary element of interpreting the law.  As Justice Souter so eloquently states,  
“A choice may have to be made, not because language is 
vague, but because the Constitution embodies the desire of 
the American people, like most people, to have things both 
ways.  We want order and security, and we want liberty.  And 
we want not only liberty but equality as well.  These paired 
desires of ours can clash, and when they do a court is forced 
to choose between them, between one constitutional good 
and another one.  The court has to decide which of our 
approved desires has the better claim, right here, right now, 
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and a court has to do more than read fairly when it makes this 
kind of choice.”      
 
 Essentially, Justice Souter hints at a key element involved in the judicial decision-
making process and that is the timing.  Thus, legal change is connected to social 
change, as the social context of the political environment and public preferences are all 
considered when justices vote to overrule established precedents or invalidate federal 
statutes (Rosenberg 2008).  However, Justice Souter also implies the role of the 
justices‟ personal preferences in that it is likely that a justice‟s ideology is a key factor 
for choosing between one constitutional good and another.  
 This study sought to examine the Supreme Court as a political institution 
comprised of political actors.  As such, the focus of this research centered on the most 
ideological leaning justices, theorizing that the ideologues would exhibit more 
pronounced activist behavior.  In general, ideologues in the masses have stronger 
partisan leanings and are less likely to moderate their attitudes.  It does not appear that 
this is the case with the most ideological justices.  Although ideology is indeed one of 
the strongest influences over judicial decision-making, the justices who lie at the 
ideological poles along the continuum appear more likely to moderate their votes than 
hypothesized.  Thus, the most ideological justices cannot be compared to the extremely 
ideological politicians in that the justices are more likely to temper their votes, likely 
because of institutional factors. The institutional legitimacy and prestige rely on the 
public‟s perceptions of a neutral, unbiased Court.  Whereas the public is willing to 
accept extremely ideological politicians, it is not likely to be so accepting of justices who 
brashly pronounce their policy preferences.  Democratically-elected politicians are held 
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accountable for their votes via reelection campaigns and responses from their 
constituents, and they campaign by expressing their personal policy preferences in 
order to identify with the public.  Supreme Court justices, on the other hand, are 
intended to moderate their votes according to the law and not ideology. 
Future Research 
 The Court is a political institution, and should be understood as such.  Political 
scientists and judicial scholars have a ways to go in order to truly understand the 
dynamic process of judicial decision-making.  Furthermore, the Court is always 
changing, as shifts in membership shape the agenda and voting coalitions.  The 
attitudinal model is accepted for its predictive power, but the model can be rigid and is 
not always able to account for changing attitudes.  As such, future research would 
benefit by considering the context in which attitudes are formed, instead of ignoring the 
influence of the political environment, legal factors and public preferences.  “The 
enormous controversy that resulted from the Warren Court‟s work, the survival and 
acceptance of the fundamental doctrinal developments of the Warren Court era result 
from its largely successful effort to accommodate a newly developing pattern of 
pluralism in America” (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 145). 
   In the aftermath of Bush v. Gore, the public now views the Court as a political 
institution, capable of rendering partisan rulings.  Observers of the Court who criticize its 
decisions as activist often cite to a so-called chilling effect on legislative action, 
suggesting that Congress is limited in its legislative proposals out of fear of Supreme 
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Court reversal.  On the other hand, as Posner (2008) suggests, a trade off functions so 
that Congress does not pass unconstitutional laws, and in return, the Supreme Court 
does not behave overtly activist lest Congress limit the Court‟s jurisdiction. 
 Judicial activism might be better understood from several facets, not only in 
cases that overrule precedent or invalidate statutes.  Activism should be redefined so 
that it characterizes judicial decision-making that is influenced by partisan preferences.  
Future research could provide a better understanding of restrainist behavior that 
actually should be considered activist in that it advances one‟s personal political goals.  
All in all, the Court is a political institution and its actors have partisan interests despite 
the black robes and air of objective decision-making.      
 A deeper understanding of the Court‟s agenda would likely lead to a more 
complete understanding of the judicial decision-making process.  Thus, future research 
should focus on what influences are significant in shaping the Court‟s agenda and how 
that, in turn, relates to judicial activism.  Further research could potentially predict how 
cases on the court‟s agenda will shape precedence conformance and votes to invalidate 
statutes. 
 One other area of research that would be quite interesting to explore is that of the 
presidential veto and its effect on the Court‟s rate of deference to federal statutes.  
Some presidents may exercise the presidential veto power more often than others, 
resulting in variation court terms‟ rates of statutory deference.  For example, President 
Clinton vetoed several abortion statutes during his two terms, essentially saving liberal 
justices a vote that could have been characterized as activist.  A comparison of 
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presidential veto rates and justice rates to invalidate federal statutes could explain 
another aspect of the separation-of-powers model and how that corresponds to judicial 
behavior.      
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Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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APPENDIX B – LIST OF CASES THAT OVERRULED PRECEDENT ON 
THE BURGER AND REHNQUIST COURTS (1969-2005) 
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Number Court 
Term 
Case Name Citation 
1 1969 Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks 
Union 
398 U.S. 235 
2 1969 Maragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. 398 U.S. 375 
3 1970 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. 
University of Illinois 
402 U.S. 313 
4 1970 Perez v. Campbell 402 U.S. 367 
5 1970 Griffin v. Breckenridge 403 U.S. 88 
6 1971 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee 406 U.S. 91 
7 1971 Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville 
Railroad Co. 
406 U.S. 320 
8 1972 Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts 
Co. 
410 U.S. 356 
9 1972 Braden v. 30
th Judicial Circuit Court of 
Kentucky 
410 U.S. 484 
10 1972 Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 
11 1973 North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy 
v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc. 
414 U.S. 156 
12 1973 Edelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 15 
13 1974 Taylor v. Louisiana 419 U.S. 522 
14 1974 United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 
Inc. 
421 U.S. 397 
15 1975 Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages 423 U.S. 276 
16 1975 Hudgens v. National Labor Relations 
Board 
424 U.S. 507 
17 1975 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Consumer Council, Inc. 
425 U.S. 748 
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18 1975 National League of Cities v. Usery 426 U.S. 833 
19 1975 Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Commission 
427 U.S. 132 
20 1975 Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153 
21 1976 Craig v. Boren 429 U.S. 190 
22 1976 Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. 429 U.S. 190 
23 1976 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady 429 U.S. 363 
24 1976 Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylania, Inc. 433 U.S. 36 
25 1976 Shaffer v. Heitner 433 U.S. 186 
26 1977 Department of Revenue of Washington 
v. Association of Washington Steve 
Doring Companies 
435 U.S. 734 
27 1977 Monell v. Department of Social 
Services 
436 U.S. 658 
28 1977 Burks v. United States 437 U.S. 1 
29 1977 United States v. Scott 437 U.S. 82 
30 1978 Hughes v. Oklahoma 441 U.S. 322 
31 1979 Trammel v. United States 445 U.S. 40 
32 1979 United States v. Salvucci 448 U.S. 83 
33 1979 Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. 448 U.S. 261 
34 1980 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana 453 U.S. 609 
35 1981 United States v. Ross 456 U.S. 798 
36 1982 Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. 213 
37 1982 Michigan v. Long 463 U.S. 1032 
38 1983 United States v. One Assortment of 89 
Firearms 
465 U.S. 354 
39 1983 Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co. 465 U.S. 354 
40 1983 Copperweld Corp v. Independence 
Tube Corp. 
467 U.S. 752 
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41 1984 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority 
469 U.S. 528 
42 1984 United States v. Miller 471 U.S. 130 
43 1985 Daniels v. Williams 474 U.S. 327 
44 1985 Batson v. Kentucky 476 U.S. 79 
45 1985 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New 
York State Liquor Authority 
476 U.S. 573 
46 1985 Rose v. Clark 478 U.S. 570 
47 1986 Griffith v. Kentucky 479 U.S. 314 
48 1986 Puerto Rico v. Branstad 483 U.S. 219 
49 1986 Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. 
Washington State Department 
483 U.S. 232 
50 1986 American Trucking Associates, Inc. v. 
Scheiner 
483 U.S. 266 
51 1986 Solorio v. United States 483 U.S. 435 
52 1986 Welch v. Texas Department of 
Highways and Public Transportation 
483 U.S. 468 
53 1987 Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. 
Mayacamas Corp. 
485 U.S. 271 
54 1987 South Carolina v. Baker 485 U.S. 505 
55 1988 Thornburgh v. Abbott 490 U.S. 401 
56 1988 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson 
American Express, Inc. 
490 U.S. 477 
57 1988 Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. 
Antonio 
490 U.S. 642 
58 1988 Alabama v. Smith 490 U.S. 794 
59 1988 Healy v. The Beer Institute 491 U.S. 324 
60 1988 Webster v. Reproductive Health 492 U.S. 490 
61 1989 Collins v. Youngblood 497 U.S. 37 
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62 1990 Shirley v. Department of Veteran 
Affairs 
498 U.S. 89 
63 1990 California v. Charles Steven Acevedo 500 U.S. 565 
64 1990 Exxon v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc. 500 U.S. 603 
65 1990 Coleman v. Thompson 501 U.S. 722 
66 1990 Payne v. Tennessee 501 U.S. 808 
67 1991 Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes 504 U.S. 1 
68 1991 Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 
69 1992 Harper v. Virginia Department of 
Taxation 
509 U.S. 86 
70 1993 Nichols v. United States 511 U.S. 738 
71 1993 Department of Labor v. Greenwich 
Collieries 
512 U.S. 267 
72 1994 Hubbard v. United States 514 U.S. 695 
73 1994 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Federico 
Pena 
515 U.S. 200 
74 1994 United States v. Gaudin 515 U.S. 506 
75 1995 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 517 U.S. 44 
76 1995 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island 517 U.S. 484 
77 1995 Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance 
Company 
517 U.S. 706 
78 1995 Lewis v. Casey 518 U.S. 343 
79 1997 State oil Company v. Barkat 522 U.S. 3 
80 1997 Hudson v. United States 524 U.S. 236 
81 1997 Hohn v. United States 527 U.S. 666 
82 1998 College Savings Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid 
527 U.S. 666 
83 1999 Guy Mitchell v. Helms 530 U.S. 793 
84 2000 U.S. v. Hatter 532 U.S. 557 
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85 2001 Lapides v. Board of Regents 535 U.S. 613 
86 2001 U.S. v. Cotton 535 U.S. 625 
87 2001 Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304 
88 2002 Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 
89 2003 Crawford v. Washington 541 U.S. 36 
90 2003 Vieth v. Jubelirer 541 U.S. 267 
91 2004 Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551 
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APPENDIX C – LIST OF CASES THAT INVALIDATED FEDERAL 
STATUTES ON THE BURGER AND REHNQUIST COURTS (1969-2005) 
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Number Court Term Case Name Citation 
1 1969 Turner v. United States 396 U.S. 398 
2 1969 Schacht v. United States 398 U.S. 58 
3 1970 Oregon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 
4 1970 Blount v. Rizzi 400 U.S. 410 
5 1970 Tilton et al. v. Richardson 403 U.S. 672 
6 1972 Frontierto v. Richardson 411 U.S. 677 
7 1972 U.S. Dept of Agriculture v. Murry  413 U.S. 508 
8 1972 U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. 
Moreno  
413 U.S. 528 
9 1973 Jimenez  v. Weinberger 417 U.S. 628 
10 1974 Weinberger v. Wisenfeld 420 U.S. 636 
11 1975 Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1 
12 1975 National League of Cities v.  
Usery 
426 U.S. 833 
13 1976 Califano v. Goldfarb 430 U.S. 199 
14 1977 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. 436 U.S. 307 
15 1978 Califano v. Westcott 443 U.S. 76 
16 1981 Northern Pipeline Construction v. 
Marathon Pipeline Co. 
458 U.S. 50 
17 1982 United States v. Grace  461 U.S. 171 
18 1982 INS v. Chadha  462 U.S. 919 
 
19 1982 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products 
Corp. 
463 U.S. 60 
20 1983 FCC v. League of Women Voters 
of California 
468 U.S. 364 
21 1984 FEC v. National Conservative 470 U.S. 480 
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Political Action Committee et al. 
22 1985 Bowsher v. Synar 478 U.S. 714 
23 1986 FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens 
for Life 
479 U.S. 238 
24 1987 Boos, Waller and Brooker v. Barry 485 U.S. 312 
25 1989 United States v. Eichman 496 U.S. 310 
26 1994 United States v. National 
Treasury Employees Union  
514 U.S. 454 
27 1994 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,  514 U.S. 211 
28 1994 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company 514 U.S. 476 
29 1994 United States v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549 
30 1995 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida 
517 U.S. 44 
31 1995 United States v IBM Corp. 517 U.S. 843 
32 1995 Colorado Republican Federal 
Campaign Committee v. FEC 
518 U.S. 604 
33 1996 Babbitt v. Youpee 519 U.S. 234 
34 1996 City of Boerne v. Flores 521 U.S. 507 
35 1996 Reno v. ACLU 521 U.S. 844 
36 1996 Printz v. United States 521 U.S. 898 
37 1997 United States v. United States 
Shoe Corporation 
523 U.S. 360 
38 1997 United States v. Hosep Krikor 
Bajakajian 
524 U.S. 321 
39 1997 Clinton v. City of New York 524 U.S. 417 
40 1997 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel 524 U.S. 498 
41 1998 Greater New Orleans 
Broadcasting Assoc., Inc. v. 
United States 
527 U.S. 173 
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42 1998 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense, Inc., v. 
College Savings Bank and United 
States 
527 U.S. 627 
43 1998 College Savings Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
Expense, Inc. 
527 U.S. 666 
44 1999 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents 528 U.S. 62 
45 1999 United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598 
46 1999 United States v. Playboy 
Enterprises Group, Inc. 
529 U.S. 803 
47 1999 Dickerson v United States 530 U.S. 428 
48 2000 Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett 
531 U.S. 356 
49 2000 Legal Services Corporation v. 
Carmen Velazquez  
531 U.S. 533 
50 2000 U.S. v. Hatter 532 U.S. 557 
51 2000 United States and Dept. of 
Agriculture v. United Foods, Inc. 
533 U.S. 405 
52 2001 Ashcroft v. The Free Speech 
Coalition 
535 U.S. 234 
53 2001 Thompson v. Western States 
Medical Center 
535 U.S. 357 
54 2004 United States v. Booker 543 U.S. 220 
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END NOTES 
                                            
i 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
ii 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
iii There is actually an argument as to whether or not Brown v. Board of Education 
overturned the precedent set by Plessy v. Ferguson.  The argument has been made 
that Brown did not directly overturn the precedent in Plessy, but rather distinguished it 
and struck down the “separate but equal” clause. 
iv EXPLAIN FURTHER 
v See, e.g., the economist, Paul Samuelson. 
vi EXPLAIN PER CURIAM AND MEMOS. 
vii Lindquist and Cross (2009, 62-63) organize the justices who were members of the 
Supreme Court between 1954 – 2004 into four categories associated with high and low 
institutional activism (defined as, “reflects the justice‟s propensity to defer to the 
coordinate branches or to exercise judicial power to enforce the constitution, regardless 
of the ideology of the underlying statute”) and high and low ideological activism 
(defined as, “the propensity to strike federal legislation that is contrary to the justice‟s 
ideology but a high propensity to uphold statutes that are ideologically aligned with the 
justice‟s preferences”).  They find that the following Justices exhibit both high 
institutional and ideological activism: Marshall, Brennan, Thomas, Scalia, Souter, 
O‟Connor, Douglas and Black.  The Justices who exhibit low institutional and ideological 
activism are: Blackmun, Breyer, White, Powell, Stewart, Frankfurter and Harlan.  The 
Justice who exhibits high institutional activism and low ideological activism is Kennedy, 
and the Justices who exhibit high ideological activism and low institutional activism are: 
Burger, Rehnquist, Ginsburg, Stevens, Clark and Warren. 
viii Video game laws have been overruled in the following states and municipalities: 
California, Illinois, Indianapolis, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota Oklahoma, St. Louis, 
and Washington.  For more information, please visit: 
http://www.theesa.com/policy/legalissues.asp. 
ix Schwarzenegger v. EMA/Entertainment Software Association. 
x For the purposes of this research, the justices‟ ideology will be measured using the 
Segal and Cover (1989) ideology scores, discussed in the next chapter. 
xi The six Justices who have been identified as the ideologues for the purpose of this 
study are: Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, Rehnquist, Stevens and Thomas.   
xii Justices Douglas and Black were excluded from this analysis as their voting records 
were not available for analysis with the U.S. Supreme Court Database.  
